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CREATION OF JOINT RIGHTS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND
WIFE IN PERSONAL PROPERTY: I
R. Bruce Townsend*
oINT1 ownership of personal property in recent years has become a
common practice--one to which husband and wife are especially
addicted. The topic is worthy of more than academic concern as
demonstrated by the public use of joint titles in the acquisition of all
kinds of personal assets, particularly investment securities.2 A casual
conversation with almost any banker would disclose that a very high
percentage of accounts owned by married people are held jointly with
their spouses.3 The current popularity of dual ownership, for example,
is reflected in the marketing policy of the United States Treasury in
the sale of savings bonds whereby a form of "co-ownership" is approved
and encouraged.4 As a matter of fact, there is some indication that the
family automobile often is registered or titled in the names of husband
and wife.5 Joint ownership to husband and wife is as much a part of
modem living as is the family automobile. The writer would estimate
that in some states over one half of the total wealth accumulated by
married persons is held jointly in one form or another. The widespread
practice on the part of married people to acquire and hold property
jointly demonstrates a deep-rooted public belief that the marriage
relationship is both a social and economic venture. In working out the
problems of joint ownership-particularly with reference to personal

J

* Associate Professor of Law,

Indiana University, Indianapolis Division.-Ed.
Unless otherwise indicated, the terms "joint" or "jointly" will be used in a generic
sense to include tenancy in common, joint tenancy, tenancy by the entireties, and other
relationships closely related to or associated with such estates.
2 See Appendix I, A.
3 See Appendix I, C.
4 United States savings bonds are issued in two joint forms. Bonds in the "co-ownership form" are issued in the names of the parties alternatively ("A or B"). Bonds in the
"beneficiary form" are issued in the name of one with right of survivorship in the other ("A,
p.o.d. B"). TRBA.s. DEPT, Cmc. 530, §315.4(a) (6th rev., Feb. 13, 1945) to be found in
ConE OP FED. RBc., tit. 31, §315.4(a) (1949). Issuance of bonds in these forms was
authorized by the first regulations governing United States savings bonds. TRBAs. DEPT.
Cmc. 530, part I, §2 (Feb. 25, 1935). See Appendix I, D.
5 See Appendix I, E.
l
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property-most of our courts have been oblivious to this fact. A great
mass of case law has produced a maze of technical concepts obstructing
the creation of joint rights, and has made for unpredictability and an
inordinate lack of uniformity. Legislative response to the situation has
been miserly and sporadic. The end result is that people who contemplate dual ownership need legal advice and in advance, but get it only
to resolve quarrels over ownership that arise subsequently between the
parties or with their representatives after death. No member of the
legal profession, however, could reasonably insist upon antecedent legal
consultation as a solution to the difficulties for which the law here is
responsible. Rights in personalty, including joint rights, most frequently
originate in the course of business dealings where the law ordinarily
does and should defer to usages and customs which make for efficiency,
certainty, and :i)J.formality without creating social objections. The law
has not reacted favorably to this theme in characterizing and ascertaining claims of joint ownership. 6 Here, then, is an area of jurisprudence
begging for reform.
From a legal standpoint, the complexities surrounding the formation of joint rights may be attributed to a handful of common law conceptions or principles that have been subjected to the forces of legal
and historical evolution. Almost every case involving the existence of
joint ownership is formally resolved by a synthesis of all or some of these
factors which serve as the major predicate for legal thinking upon the
subject. An effort will be made to classify these components briefly,
consider them in detail, and offer a solution by proposing that the subject is ripe for a uniform or model law.
First of these is the special treatment accorded to joint ownership
by husband and wife who acquire property in their joint names. Here,
6 "There seems to be a growing disposition on the part of some to deplore the progressively increasing tendency of spouses to take title to real property in joint tenancy. The
writer has heard it asserted on more than one occasion within the past year or more that
there are literally thousands of these deeds in joint tenancy in Bernalillo County alone.
So what? Maybe that is the way the grantee spouses have wished it.. Such would surely
be a fair and natural assumption••••
"It becomes all the more important, then, that we do not by self-imposed conditions
as to degree of proof essential to validity, applicable not only to deeds in joint tenancy to
husbands and wives but as well to other forms of conveyance in which the wife's name
appears as grantee, so magnify the burden resting on the wife as survivor in joint tenancy
as to force a practical abandonment of use by spouses bf this form of conveyance in taking
title to property. If, indeed, the estates in joint tenancy of husbands and wives are as
numerous as suggested in Bernalillo County and throughout the state, as for that matter,
then, the law as declared today by the majority should be a matter of deepest concern to all
spouses ·so holding, lest their intention in the creation of such estates be utterly defeated."
Dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Sadler, In re Trimble's Estate, (N.M. 1953)' 253 P.
(2d) 805 at 819.
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the common law projected the marital relationship into the less romantic sphere of property ownership by creating an extraordinary kind of
partnership or closed corporation known to lawyers as tenancy by the
entireties.7 The most significant incident attached to this estate was
the right of survivorship. In the formative years of our common law
it was confined largely to interests in real property for the apparent
reason that substantial investments in personal property were rare to
the economy of those times. The right to income and managerial
powers were merged in the husband who represented the unity of
ownership.8 An unfounded0 belief arose many years later that entireties could not exist in personal property because of the wife's incapacity
over personalty which she brought to, or which came to her during the
marriage. As a consequence, a group of states today favor entireties
ownership in real estate but refuse to apply the same rule to personal
property. It was not until the time of the industrial revolution that
joint ownership of personalty by husband and wife became the subject
of extensive litigation. Shortly thereafter, the married women's property laws added confusion to the problem. In England and a few of
the states, entireties in all kinds of property was washed out by judges
expressing their beliefs as to the policy of this legislation by holding
that its purpose was to separate the single entity concept attached to
marriage from property ownership. In other jurisdictions, either by
statute or decision, tenancy by the entireties continued as a favorite of
the law, but was properly modified by the new freedom given to married women in that it took from the husband his exclusive management
over the property. Little thought, however, was given to the philosophy
of family economic security lying at the root of this estate, as it has with
respect to other similar interests characterized by the law as dower,
curtesy and, in the civil law, community property.
A second principle of the common law affecting the rights of joint
owners was that which favored joint tenancy where title was taken in
7 Although Coke apparently treated joint ownership by husband and wife as a form
of joint tenancy, Mr. Freeman took some considerable time to insist that joint tenancy and
tenancy by the entirety were distinct classes of co-tenancies. Compare CoKI! Lrrr. *187b,
with FREEMAN, CoTBNANCY AND PARTITION §64 (1874).
s Only Massachusetts, North Carolina and, to a limited extent, Michigan continue to
recognize this incident of tenancy by the entireties. Splaine v. Morrissey, 282 Mass. 217,
184 N.E. 670 (1933) (income from entireties bank deposit subject to claims of H's creditors); Williams v. Williams, 231 N.C. 33, 56 S.E. (2d) 20 (1949) (income from entireties property belonged to H). Compare Arrand v. Graham, 297 Mich. 559, 298 N.W.
281, 300 N.W. 16 (1941) (husband retains rights to control, lease, and collect rents from
entireties real estate, but his interest is not subject to claims of his individual creditors).
9 FREEMAN, CoTBNANCY AND PARTITION §66 (1874); Miller, "Tenancy by Entirety
in Personal Property in Oregon," 3 ORE. L. REv. 163 at 165-168 (1924).
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the names of two or more persons. For some reason or another, which
does not appear, a legislative prejudice in the nineteenth century against
the survivorship incident of joint tenancy swept over the country preferring tenancy in common as a rule of construction in the absence of
an affirmative expression of intent to create joint tenancy or survivorship
rights. 10 Some of these laws literally apply to titles taken by husband
and wife. Some exclude husband and wife from their operation. A
few include entireties while a few more exclude the estate. Most of
the enactments fail to deal with the special matter of husband-wife
ownership. Many of the laws do not in terms apply to personal property. Extraordinary constructions were given to the language of these
acts, but by and large they have had a most pronounced effect of leading
courts into repetitious expressions of policy against the survivorship
incident of joint tenancy and in some states tenancy by the entireties.
Thus was born a new body of law concerned primarily with semantics,
and the outcome of efforts on the part of the public to circumvent what
appears to have been the unpopular effect of the statutes. In recent
years legislation pertaining to the creation of joint bank deposits,1 1 and
in some cases to particular kinds of personal property,12 has been enacted to facilitate the creation of joint rights, but poor draftsmanship
has led to additional problems of int~rpretation. ·
The formal requisites of gift law constitute a third legal impediment
to the creation of joint rights in personalty. The gift problem arises
most frequently ·when an owner of property or funds has attempted to
establish or acquire joint rights in property with another. For example,
H may attempt to create a joint tenancy bank account simply by opening or changing the account to read in the names of himself and W.
Strict allegiance to the common law formality of manual tradition too
often has caused courts to illegalize the efforts of the donor if the chattel
or a written chose in action capable of tradition is not delivered to the
donee.13 Parol evidence is allowed-almost indiscriminately-to support or impeach the donor's gift intent, and this rule may be exploited
10 A number of these laws purport to "abolish" joint tenancy or the incident of survivorship. The states with such statutes are Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and possibly Oregon. See Appendix II, col. 3.
11 All of the states have statutes purporting to regulate joint bank deposits. See Appendix ID, and notes 214, 215.
12 See note 81. The latest addition to this collection of laws will be found in New
Jersey where a recent statute provides that mortgages running to husband and wife "shall
be held ••• as joint tenants ••• unless otherwise therein provided." N.J. Rev. Stat. Cum.
Supp. (1952) §46:2D-l.
13 Typically, the problem arises where property is acquired by the donor in the name
of the donor and donee without manual delivery to the donee. Thus H may open a bank
account in the names of H and W and fail to give W possession of the pass book or
certificate of deposit. The cases are divided as to whether or not this meets the common law
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to defeat the donor's purpose although it is clearly expressed in the
form of a writing signed or accepted by him.14 However, there has
been a general awakening to the fact that these formalities are poorly
adjusted to the ordinary methods customarily employed by people in
executing gifts of joint rights in personal property. The modem tendency is away from the need for manual delivery in situations where
joint ownership is designated in the course of a contractual or legal
relation with a third person. The donor's objective conduct here is fully
equivalent to any purpose served by manual delivery and is becoming
accepted as a constructive substitute for this requirement of gift law.
The loose practice of allowing triers of fact to speculate as to the donor's
gift "intent'' in those typical cases where his thoughts have been impressed in reliable written form has proved costly. Interested parties
are encouraged to litigate the issue after the donor's death when the
relevant sources of proof are not available. A cure for this problem lies
in the parol evidence rule, and this solution has steadily been winning
friends in the legislatures and appellate tribunals. The place of the
parol evidence rule has not been fixed in this area of the law, only
because lawyers and judges have failed to appraise the pertinent analogies to which the rule has been extended.
Inversely related to that of gifts is a fourth type of legal problem
originating when both parties furnish consideration toward the joint
ownership of personal property under an executory or executed agreement. While technical formalities of gift are eliminated in such cases,
the law has had some trouble in working out the rights of the parties
under executory agreements, and in enforcing claims against specific
property.15 It sometimes is difficult to prove mutual assent where one
requirements of delivery. E.g., compare Chippendale v. North Adams Sav. Bank, 222
Mass. 499, 111 N.E. 371 (1916) (rights of the donee sustained on theory of contract),
with Reese v. First Nat. Bank, (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) 196 S.W. (2d) 48 (donor kept
negotiable certificate of deposit taken in names of donor or donee). The subject of delivery
will be considered in a separate article.
14 In some states the form of the transfer may be conclusive of gift intent. E.g.,
Matthew v. Moncrief, (D.C. Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 645 (donor and donee signed signature card defining their rights as joint owners). In some states the form of the transfer may
be prima facie evidence of gift intent. E.g., In re Staver's Estate, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W.
655 (1935). In still others the form of the transfer may be no evidence of gift intent, so
that the donee must supply additional parol proof of the donor's purpose. E.g., Kelly v.
Beers, 194 N.Y. 49, 86 N.E. 980 (1909). These and other distinctions with reference to
the subject of gifts will be considered in a subsequent paper.
15 A unique decision is Williams v. Williams, 231 N.C. 33, 56 S.E. (2d) 20 (1949).
Title to property was taken in W's name upon an agreement that it would be held by the
entireties with H. W furnished the down payment, and the balance was paid from earnings from the property which were held to be contributions from H inasmuch as a husband
retains control over rents and profits from entireties property. The agreement was enforced,
apparently, upon the theory of an express or constructive trust.
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uses funds of both to acquire property, title to which is procured in
joint tenancy or entireties form. 16 Personal property, because of its Huid
or movable character, is easily transferred with the rather peculiar consequence that the status of ownership often is preserved by tracing the
rights of the parties to the proceeds. Take the case where H and W
hold a joint tenancy bank account, and from this fund one or both of
them purchase a camera.17 Except for proof of a contrary agreement,
few courts would deny that the camera is held in joint tenancy. But
legal difficulties are complicated if one purchases the camera without
the other's assent or knowledge. A number of states recognize and
favor entireties ownership of real property but refuse to favor and even
deny that the estate can exist in personalty. The unsoundness of this
dubious line of distinction is emphasized when entireties real estate is
exchanged for personal assets. 18 While it appears that these matters go
somewhat beyond the issues associated with the formation and creation of joint rights (the subject of this paper), cumulatively they
raise a type of question which has remained substantially unanswered,
i.e., can husband and wife contract to hold present and future property
in joint tenancy or entireties form, and if so to what extent does their
ownership take on aspects similar to those of community property?
For if joint ownership can be projected into the future, the law of
community property furnishes the only significant analogy from which
a solution to the matters of dual control can be resolved.
A fifth deterrent to those people choosing to acquire property
jointly is a procedural one, but one which magnifies the significance
of the other formalities governing the creation of such rights. This
is the legislation prohibiting a party from testifying as to transactions
with a deceased person19-commonly referred to as the "dead man's"
16 It is for this reason that so much trouble with joint ownership occurs in the community states. Where community funds are used to acquire property in a form which
would create one of the common law forms of co-ownership both parties must assent to the
transmutation. Therefore, unless the transfer instrument shows that both parties have
assented thereto the effectiveness of the transfer may depend upon parol proof that both
parties assented. Cf. Collier v. Collier, 73 Ariz. 405, 242 P. (2d) 537 (1952) (assent
established by signed indorsement of both parties upon a joint tenancy deed); In re
Trimble's Estate, (N.M. 1953) 253 P. (2d) 805 (W did not know that deed was taken
in joint tenancy form-held, that property retained its character as community).
11 Hoyle v. Hoyle, 31 Del. Ch. 64, 66 A. (2d) 130 (1949).
18 This anomaly has sometimes led to queer results. Compare Turlington v. Lucas,
186 N.C. 283, 119 S.E. 366 (1923) (bonds received in exchange for entireties real estate
held in common), with Place v. Place, 206 N.C. 676, 174 S.E. 747 (1934) (money
received in exchange for entireties real estate held as tenants by the entireties). Comment
upon these cases will be found in 13 N.C.L. REv. 256 (1935).
19 The law proceeds upon the idea that a gift should be accompanied by a blaring of
trumpets and a formal announcement in the public square. In truth gifts are often con-
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statutes. The statutes operate with particular force to joint survivorship interests because the rights of the parties are most frequently
disputed after one of them is dead. There is no need here to quarrel
with the policy of these laws. But they dramatize, in a practical way,
the deficiency in our substantive law which generally has failed to
give conclusive and in some cases even presumptive effect to written
evidence of gifts and other transactions showing that joint rights were
intended. By excluding what is often the next best source of proof, litigation not infrequently is reduced to the level of a game of chance.
A sixth restriction upon. the creation of joint rights is the statute
of frauds. Unfortunately, it does not specifically contemplate some
of the rather odd problems arising from the efforts of two or more
persons to acquire joint interests in personal property.20 While the
statute ordinarily does not apply to gifts, statutes interfering with the
creation of joint survivorship rights on occasions have been construed
as a kind of supplement to the statute of frauds. A lack of reliable
authority dealing with contracts to hold chattels and choses jointly
has left a number of problems unsettled.
A seventh legal formality having to do with the establishment of
joint tenancy and tenancy by the entireties is the so-called "four
unities" rule. 21 This fantastic conception originated with Blackstone
as a verbal description of something only partly supported by judicial
authority. Its most significant effect in this country has been to prohibit the creation of joint tenancies and entireties by a direct transfer
from an owner to himself and another. However, the rule in most
states has been abandoned; in others it has been replaced by something
which is not much better; and there are but few indications that the
rule is applicable to transactions involving personal property. Because
it serves no useful purpose, it is no compliment to the legal profession
that the rule has not long disappeared from the law books.
summated in the utmost of humility and in circumstances where the donee is the only
available witness. Since the donee is disqualified by the "dead man's" statute the gift may
fail because of opposing proof or because the donee cannot meet the burden of proof. E.g.,
compare Flanagan v. Nash, 185 Pa. 41, 39 A. 818 (1898); In re Hounsell's Estate, 252
Wis. 138, 31 N.W. (2d) 203 (1948).
20 Few cases will be found where the statute of frauds was applied to joint ownership
agreements. In some states joint tenancy statutes have been construed as requiring acquisition of joint tenancy rights in personalty to be in writing. E.g., Harvey v. United States,
(7th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 463; In re Hom's Estate, 102 Cal. App. (2d) 635, 228 P.
(2d) 99 (1951). Compare the statutory provisions set forth in Appendix II, col. 6.
21 These are the so-called unities of "interest, title, time and possession." For an example of an application of the rule to acquisitions of personal property, see Rigby v. Rigby,
(Del. 1952) 88 A. (2d) 126. For statutory modifications see Appendix II, col. 7.
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I. The English Experience
The common law segregated joint ownership by husband and wife
from the other joint estates by characterizing the relation separately,
and ultimately as "tenancy by the entireties."22 This common law
experience has had a terrific impact upon current legal notions and
beliefs.23 Most important has been the supposition that the common
law estate of tenancy by the entireties was confined to interests in real
estate.24 It is true that the estate ordinarily arose by operation of law
where real estate was conveyed or devised to husband and wife. 25 It
was not unlike joint tenancy in that survivorship was its most important
incident,26 but it differed materially because the relation could not be
terminated by one of the parties. 27 The husband, however, retained
control over the property with the right to rents and profits during his
lifetime.28 Aside from some of the technical troubles arising out of the
22 A few common law authorities will be found to the effect that husband and wife
could own property jointly only as tenants by the entireties. This, if it ever gained a substantial foothold in the law (and this is doubtful), has long since been repudiated. See
notes 241-243.
23 It is the habit of authors and judges to follow a conventional and almost rhythmic
pattern of reviewing common law principles controlling the rights of joint owners. A fur.
ther review of the common law authorities at this late date would be unnecessary except
for two reasons: (1) Seldom has careful thought been given to the common law cases
involving joint ownership of personal property by husband and wife. (2) No explanation
has been forthcoming as to why the social reasons underlying the common law customs
regulating marital ownership should be ignored or summarily cast aside-as so many courts
have done.
24 13 lowA L. REv. 108 (1927); 72 Umv. PA. L. REv. 328 (1924). Contra,
FREBMAN, CoTENANCY AND PARTITION §68 (1874).
25 Co. Lrrr. "187a. One of the peculiar effects of the rule occurred where property
was conveyed to the husband, wife, and a third person. Here husband and wife took but
one moiety by the entireties. E.g., Bricker v. Whatley, 1 Vern. 233, 23 Eng. Rep. 435
(1684); Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A. (2d) 258 (1949) (deed to F, H and W
as "joint tenants" reformed to create tenancy by entireties as to one half). Compare Mauser
v. Mauser, 326 Pa. 257, 192 A. 137 (1937) (bank account in names of "H or W oi: son"
held by parties as tenants in common), with Heatter v. Lucas, 367 Pa. 296, 80 A. (2d)
749 (1951) (deed to "X, H and W his wife" created tenancy by entireties in one-half of
the property-court indicated that had the conveyance not referred to the marital status of
the parties they would have held in three equal shares). Subsequent marriage of a man
and woman holding property by joint tenancy did not create an entireties relation, but the
joint estate continued. Co. Lrrr. "187b. The origin of tenancy by the entireties is obscure.
See 3 HoLnswonTH, HrsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 128 (1927).
26 The property passed to the survivor by force of the estate, and could not be defeated
by will except upon the theory of election. Low v. Carter, 1 Beav. 426, 48 Eng. Rep. 1005
(1839); Coates v. Stevens, 1 Y. & C. 66, 160 Eng. Rep. 28 (1834); Dummer v. Pitcher,
2 My. & K. 262, 39 Eng. Rep. 944 (1833).
27 Green ex dem. Crew v. King, 2 W. Bl. 1211, 96 Eng. Rep. 713 (1778); Back v.
Andrew, 2 Vern. 120, 23 Eng. Rep. 687 (1690) (mortgage by H).
28 Bacon v. Smith, 1 Q.B. 345, 113 Eng. Rep. 1164 (1841) (surviving W could not
maintain waste for injury to entireties realty during lifetime of H); Arnold v. Skeale,
Noy 149, 74 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1669) (H's executor recovered in trespass against wife who
took crops from entireties real estate). It is quite probable that the husband could lease
entireties real estate. Cf. Grute v. Locraft, Cro. Eliz. 287, 78 Eng. Rep. 541 (1591). It is
doubtful that the lease was binding upon the surviving wife. Cf. 32 Hen. 8, c. 28 (1540).
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rigid formalities governing the creation of the estate,29 relatively few
disputes concerning the relation found their way into litigation.
But as applied to personal property there is some indication from
the authorities supporting the belief that the estate was a legal impossibility.30 This followed logically from the judicial fiction that merged
the identity of the wife in the husband who in tum acquired almost full
control over her personal assets. The married woman, for most practical
purposes, was incapable of owning personal assets. She was barred from
a fair economic share in the personal estate of the husband31 as well as
her own32 both during the marriage and upon his death. Thus for a
considerable period of common law history gifts between the parties
were ineffective.33 However, several mitigating developments came to
permit the wife to hold a separate or qualified interest in personal property. Choses in action owned by the wife before marriage or coming to
her thereafter passed to her where she survived the husband, providing
he had not theretofore received payment, or, as the cases put it, caused
them to be "reduced to possession."34 It was upon this theory, too, that
If it was binding on the wife, she was entitled to the rent. Temple v. Temple, Cro. Eliz.
791, 78 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1601).
29 E.g., Bricker v. Whatley, 1 Vern. 233, 23 Eng. Rep. 435 (1684); Gordon v.
Whieldon, 11 Beav. 170, 50 Eng. Rep. 782 (1848); Kingdon v. Bridges, 2 Vern. 67,
23 Eng. Rep. 653 (1688).
30Watts v. Thomas, 2 P. Wms. 364, 24 Eng. Rep. 767 {1726) (husband's creditors
prevailed over surviving wife against equity of redemption in mortgaged leasehold held in
their joint names). Cf. Coomes v. Elling, 3 Atk. 676, 26 Eng. Rep. 1188 (1747) (purchase by husband of a leasehold in the joint names of H and W held to be a fraud on
the wife in violation of the Custom of London since the husband could dispose of joint
property and thus defeat the wife's right of inheritance).
31 If he chose to do so, the husband could disinherit his wife and family from any
share in his personal estate. However, by special custom in some parts of England this was
not permitted. 3 HoLDSWORTH, HxsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 552 (1927). By the Family
Provision Act of 1938, "reasonable provision for maintenance" must be allowed to the surviving spouse and children. l & 2 GEo. 6, c. 45. The common law, of course, required
the husband to maintain his wife during his lifetime. Thompson v. Hervey, 4 Burr. 2177,
98 Eng. Rep. 136 (1768); 3 HoLDsWORTH, supra, at 530.
82 With few exceptions, the husband was given full control over the personal property
of the wife. Co. LITT. *3OOa. This right could not be defeated by the wife's will, unless
the husband assented to it. Marlborough v. Godolphin, 2 Ves. Sr. 61, 28 Eng. Rep. 41
(1750).
83 63 SELDEN Soc., YEAR BooK SERIES 187, 190, case 4 (1311); 3 HoLDswoRTH,
HxsTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 527 (1927).
34E.g., Nash v. Nash, 2 Madd. 133, 56 Eng. Rep. 284 (1817) (uncollected portion of
Ws promissory note passed to her); Wildman v. Wildman, 9 Ves. Jr. 174, 32 Eng. Rep.
568 (1803) (stock). A right of action for injury to personal property was treated as a
chose in action and passed to the surviving wife if uncollected by the husband. See Ayling
v. Whicher, 6 Ad. & E. 259, 112 Eng. Rep. 99 at 100 (1837); Nelthrop v. Anderson, 1
Salk. 114, 91 Eng. Rep. 104 at 105 (1706). The wife could join with her husband in
bringing suit upon her choses in action. Philliskirk v. Pluckwell, 2 M. & S. 393, 105 Eng.
Rep. 427 (1814). Cf. Dalton v. Midland Counties Ry., 13 C.B. 474, 138 Eng. Rep. 1284
(1853) (suit by wife alone could be defeated only by plea in abatement). Where the
husband survived, the wife's intangible property passed to him in any event. Humphrey
v. Bullen, 1 Atk. 458, 26 Eng. Rep. 291 (1737).
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the husband could not defeat the wife's future interests in personal
property which could not vest in possession during his lifetime. 35
Where personalty was retained or given to the wife for her separate
use, equity enforced her separate rights upon a use or trust theory, 38
binding the husband as trustee in cases where none was named. 37
Upon this basis gifts from husband to wife ultimately became effective. 38 These events added Hexibility to estate planning of the English
people and combined to demonstrate a popular reaction against a legal
system which approved impoverishment of the married woman. It
fostered the marriage settlement or jointure which may have been bene£cial to the wife, for it was through this device that the married woman
often acquired a separate estate in personalty. 39
Out of this legal evolution which gave the wife at least a limited
capacity to enjoy rights of ownership in personal property came the
further recognition that she could hold property in her own right, so that
decisions were compelled by the force of logic to hold that the wife could
35 Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 1 (1823).
38 Although some of the earlier cases cast doubt upon the subject, it came :finally to
be settled that the wife exercised unfettered control over property settled to her own use.
E.g., Pybus v. Smith, 3 Bro. C.C. 340, 29 Eng. Rep. 570 (1791) (assignment of future
earnings from bank annuities by wife for the purpose of paying debts of husband enforced).
37Rich v. Cockell, 9 Ves. Jr. 369, 32 Eng. Rep. 644 (1802); Bennet v. Davis, 2 P.
Wms. 316, 24 Eng. Rep. 746 (1725). The husband was bound as trustee where the property was settled to the wife's separate use prior to marriage. Newlands v. Paynter, 4 My.
& Cr. 408, 41 Eng. Rep. 158 (1840); Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. & Cr. 377, 41 Eng.
Rep. 147 (1839). Equity, too, would compel the husband or his assignee to make a family
settlement for the wife and children whenever the property was subject to equity jurisdiction. E.g., Michelmore v. Mudge, 2 Giff. 183, 66 Eng. Rep. 77 (1860); Oswell v.
Probert, 2 Ves. Jr. 680, 30 Eng. Rep. 839 (1795). But cf. Paschall v. Thurston, 2 Bro.
P.C. IO, 1 Eng. Rep. 759 (1734).
3BLucas v. Lucas, l Atk. 270, 26 Eng. Rep. 172 (1738). A legal gift from husband
to wife was technically difficult since her possession was his, thus making delivery fictionally impossible. In re Breton's Estate, 17 Ch. Div. 416 (1881); Grant v. Grant, 34 Beav.
623, 55 Eng. Rep. 776 (1865). Hence gifts from husband to wife were enforced in equity
where it could be found that the husband had declared himself trustee for the wife.
Baddeley v. Baddeley, 9 Ch. Div. ll3 (1878). Cf. Simmons v. Simmons, 6 Hare. 352,
67 Eng. Rep. 1202 (1847) (gift effective on basis of equitable estoppel).
39 E.g., Walrond v. Goldmann, 16 Q.B. Div. 121 (II85); Alt v. Alt, 4 Giff. 84, 66
Eng. Rep. 630 (1862); Ex parte Ray, 1 Madd. 199, 56 Eng. Rep. 74 (1815); Rider v.
Kidder, IO Ves. Jr. 360, 32 Eng. Rep. 884 (1805). " .•• Agreements for settling estates
to the separate use of the wife on marriage are very frequent, relating both to real and
personal estate." Peacock v. Monk, 2 Ves. Sr. 190, 191, 28 Eng. Rep. 123 (1750). The
wife, however, could be barred of her dower rights by accepting a marriage settlement of
personal property. Dyke v. Rendall, 2 DeG.M. & G. 209, 42 Eng. Rep. 851 (1852). It
may be that the estate of tenancy by entireties grew out of the jointure or family settlement
for it is not uncommon to :find cases referring to the joint interests of husband and wife
as "jointures." E.g., Norton v. Glover, Noy 149, 74 Eng. Rep. lll0 (1669). Cf. 2
BLACKST. CoMM. "'180. Joint interests in personalty were often created by marriage settlements. E.g., In re Bryan, 14 Ch. Div. 516 (1880); Ward v. Ward, 14 Ch. Div. 506
(1880); Homer v. Bendloes, 9 Mod. 335, 88 Eng. Rep. 490 (1742).
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acquire an entireties interest with her husband in personalty-an interest which could not wholly be defeated by him. Hence, the idea that
the wife retained a survivorship right to choses in action brought by her
to the marriage left no doubt that contract rights held by husband and
wife in their joint names passed to the survivor.40 Equity, which enforced the separate rights of the wife to personalty settled to her own
use, carried this policy over to all types of personal property taken in
their joint names by giving effect to the survivorship incident of the
entireties estate.41 In fact the great majority of the decisions validating
40Low v. Carter, I Beav. 426, 48 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1839); Draper v. Jackson, 16
Mass. 480 (1820); 13 IowA L. R:sv. 108 (1927). While this proposition is incapable of
positive proof, the great bulk of the cases giving a right of survivorship to choses in action
held in the names of husband and wife apparently proceeded upon this theory. Drew v.
Martin, 2 H. & M. 130, 71 Eng. Rep. 411 (1864) (contract to purchase realty in names
of H and W passed to surviving wife); Laprimaudaye v. Teissier, 12 Beav. 206, 50 Eng.
Rep. 1038 (1849) (stock dividends carried in the joint names of H and W); Coates v.
Stevens, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 66, 160 Eng. Rep. 28 (1834) (stock placed in names of H and
W by husband passed to surviving wife); Norton v. Glover, Noy 149, 74 Eng. Rep. 1110
(1669) (debt held by husband and wife passed to surviving wife); Temple v. Temple,
Cro. Eliz. 791, 78 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1601) (right to rent held by H and W passed to
surviving wife). In general compare cases cited in notes 43-49. The close connection
between joint tenancy, and the concept that the wife retained a survivorship right in her
choses in action is illustrated by Becket v. Becket, 1 Dick. 340, 21 Eng. Rep. 300 at 301
(1760) where the court in applying the latter principle spoke as follows: ''But if it be
specific, and not reduced into possession, the husband and wife will be considered as joint
tenants, and it will go to the survivor."
41 "I think I must take it that this was a trust created by the testator for his wife."
Gosling v. Gosling, 3 Drew 335, 61 Eng. Rep. 931 (1855) (upholding survivorship rights
of wife to promissory note which the husband caused to be changed to names of H and
W). Equity favored the right of survivorship between husband and wife in any case where
the court acquired jurisdiction over property held in their joint names. In re Eykyn's
Trusts, 6 Ch. Div. 115 (1877) (husband transferred stock and debentures to names of
"H, W and trustees of family settlement-held trustees retained property in trust for surviving wife); Lannoy v. Lannoy, Sel. Cas. t. King 48, 25 Eng. Rep. 216 (1725) (wife's
survivorship right to stock purchased by husband with funds inherited by wife sustained
on equitable principle that property came through her). Cf. Re Crump, 34 Beav. 570, 55
Ch. 755 (1865) (equity sanctioned transfer of wife's separate property under marriage
settlement to joint names of husband and wife); Smith v. Warde, 15 Simm. 55, 60 Eng.
Rep. 537 (1845) (survivorship defeated upon proof of intent to create an express trust for
third party which failed); Terral v. Terral, 212 Ark. 221, 205 S.W. (2d) 198 (1947). See
Coomes v. Elling, 3 Atk. 676, 26 Eng. Rep. 1188 at 1190 (1747). See also the cases in
chancery cited in note 40. That entireties ownership was favored by equity is reH.ected in
several decisions which created this relation in awarding a settlement to the wife out of her
separate property. Bond v. Simmons, 3 Atk. 20, 26 Eng. Rep. 815 (1743); Steed v. Calley,
2 My. & K. 52, 39 Eng. Rep. 864 (1833). Since equity protected the wife's reversionary
interests in personal property, which could not vest during coverture, a large number of
cases will be found where survivorship interests were sustained under transfers to husband
and wife for their joint lives. E.g., Moffatt v. Burnie, 18 Beav. 211, 52 Eng. Rep. 83
(1853); Smith v. Oakes, 14 Sim. 122, 60 Eng. Rep. 304 (1844); Townley v. Bolton, 1
My. & K. 148, 39 Eng. Rep. 637 (1832); Cowper v. Scott, 3 P. Wms. 119, 24 Eng. Rep.
993 (1731). Cf. Attorney General v. Burnie, 3 Y. & J. 531, 148 Eng. Rep. 1290 (1830)
(holding that husband and wife each held a life estate in a separate moiety for tax purposes).
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the joint or entireties relation came out of chancery.42 Consequently,
where stock,4 3 mortgages,44 bank annuities,45 a bank account46 or a
promissory note47 were procured by the husband18 in the names of
both parties, where they both obtained a judgment in their joint
names,4 9 and where husband and wife were named as beneficiaries by
will,50 trust,51 or family settlement,52 equity awarded the property to
the survivor. It is significant, however, that the common law courts
until relatively modem times failed to classify entireties ownership of
chattel property as such.53 Moreover, no clearly defined principles governing the rights of the parties inter se or as against third persons will
be found in the early decisions.54 The uncertainty engendered by the
42 See cases cited in notes 40, 41. An opinion has been expressed to the effect that
entireties ownership in personal property, if it existed at common law, was confined to
interests held by mortgagees under the theory that the mortgagee held legal title to the real
estate. Stout v. Van Zante, 109 Ore. 430, 219 P. 804, 220 P. 414 (1923) (no primary
authorities cited). This opinion is wholly without foundation. E.g., Doe dem. Freestone
v. Parratt, 5 T.R. 652, IOI Eng. Rep. 363 (1794) (indicating that husband and wife would
hold mortgage in their joint names as tenants by the entireties either at law or in equity);
Miller, "Tenancy by the Entirety in Personal Property in Oregon," 3 ORE. L. REv. 163
at 172-174 (1924). Compare cases cited in note 91.
43 Vance v. Vance, I Beav. 605, 48 Eng. Rep. 1076 (1839); Coates v. Stevens, 1 Y.
& C. Ex. 66, 160 Eng. Rep. 28 (1834); Lannoy v. Lannoy, Sel. Cas. t. King, 48, 25 Eng.
Rep. 216 (1725).
44 Doe dem. Freestone v. Parratt, 5 T.R. 652, IOI Eng. Rep. 363 (1794); Christ's
Hospital v. Budgin, 2 Vern. 683, 23 Eng. Rep. 1043 (1712).
45 Low v. Carter, I Beav. 426, 48 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1839); Dummer v. Pitcher, 2
My. & K. 262, 39 Eng. Rep. 944 (1833).
46 Williams v. Davies, 3 Sw. & Tr. 437, 164 Eng. Rep. 1344 (1864); In re Young,
28 Ch. Div. 705 (1885).
47 Gosling v. Gosling, 3 Drewry 335, 61 Eng. Rep. 931 (1855).
48 That the wife could create an entireties interest in husband and wife with her
separate personal property compare In re Young, 28 Ch. Div. 705 (1885), with Darkin v.
Darkin, 17 Beav. 578, 51 Eng. Rep. II59 (1853) (husband held under an express trust
for wife).
49 Coppin v......... , 2 P. Wms. 496, 24 Eng. Rep. 832 (1728); Nanney v. Martin,
1 Ch. Cas. 27, 22 Eng. Rep. 676 (1663).
50 Atcheson v. Atcheson, II Beav. 485, 50 Eng. Rep. 905 (1849); Cowper v. Scott,
3 P. Wms. ll9, 24 Eng. Rep. 993 (1731). See Bricker v. Whatley, 1 Vern. 233, 23 Eng.
Rep. 435 (1684).
51Jn re Eykyn's Trusts, 6 Ch. Div. ll5 (1877).
52 See note 39.
53 E.g., Bricker v. Whatley, I Vern. 233, 23 Eng. Rep. 435 (1684). The first case
referring to ownership of personal property by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties
seems to be Atcheson v. Atcheson, II Beav. 485, 50 Eng. Rep. 905 (1849).
54 The cases were in hopeless conflict concerning the husband's right to transfer entireties personalty. Where husband and wife held as mortgagees jointly by devise it was held
that the husband could not defeat the wife's survivorship right by conveyance. Doe dem.
Freestone v. Parratt, 5 T.R. 652, 101 Eng. Rep. 363 (1794). But cf. Grute v. Locroft,
Cro. Eliz. 287, 78 Eng. Rep. 541 (1790) (lease by husband of term held as "joint
tenants" binding upon surviving wife). On the other hand cases will be found where
the husband effectively encumbered entireties property. Watts v. Thomas, 2 P. Wms. 364,
24 Eng. Rep. 767 (1726) (husband mortgaged term-held equity of redemption passed to
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conflicting authorities upon this point was resolved in 1849 by the case
of Atcheson '17. Atcheson,55 where equity intervened to bind the husband as trustee of funds held by husband and wife in their joint names.
The husband, however, was given rights to the income and use of the
property during his lifetime. The force of this decision, which preserved the corpus of the estate through the trust device and awarded
full control of use, rents and profits to the husband, was subsequently
confirmed by Ward '17. Ward56 and In re Bryan.51 Creditors of the husband were permitted to reach the income from joint property by these
his creditors). Cf. Paschall v. Thurston, 2 Brown IO, l Eng. Rep. 759 (1734). The
cases which allowed the husband to defeat the wife's survivorship right were based upon
the theory that the husband exercised full control over the wife's personal assets. As a
matter of principle this was unsound in view of the decisions which recognized that the
husband could not defeat the wife's reversionary interests in personal property which did
not come into possession during his lifetime. Purdew v. Jackson, l Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. l
(1823); Duberley v. Day, 16 Beav. 33, 51 Eng. Rep. 688 at 691-692 (1852) (where
analogy made to an interest held in property for their joint lives). That the surviving wife
could trace jointly owned property which had been misappropriated by the husband, compare Darkin v. Darkin, 17 Beav. 578, 51 Eng. Rep. 1159 (1853) (evidence showed that
husband agreed to make provision for wife in realty purchased with joint funds). The
contrary was true where the wife consented. Cf. In re Young, 28 Ch. Div. 705 (1885)
(holding that investments made in the name of the husband from a joint bank account
upon which each had the power to draw did not pass to the wife-court rejected the argument that the power to withdraw was limited to ordinary household expenses).
There is some authority to the effect that husband and wife could mutually partition
entireties property. In re Linzee's Settlement, 23 Beav. 241, 53 Eng. Rep. 94 (1856)
(division of income from trust held for joint lives of husband and wife). But cf. Richards
v. Chambers, IO Ves. Jr. 580, 32 Eng. Rep. 970 (1805) (equity refused to allow wife to
set over her reversionary interest to husband who held life estate). Uncollected earnings of
property held in the joint names of husband and wife passed to the surviving widow.
Laprlmaudaye v. Teissier, 12 Beav. 206, 50 Eng. Rep. 1038 (1849) (dividends accrued
from annuities, but uncollected); Temple v. Temple, Cro. Eliz. 791, 78 Eng. Rep. 1021
(1601) (surviving wife's administrator recovered rent which accrued from joint leasehold
during lifetime of husband). But cf. Bacon v. Smith, l Q.B. 345, 113 Eng. Rep. 1164
(1841) (action of waste upon joint real estate did not pass to surviving wife); Arnold v.
Skeale, Noy 149, 74 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1669) (surviving wife who took crops from entireties
realty liable to husband's executor in trespass). Where a contract to purchase real estate
was taken· in the names of husband and wife the whole interest ultimately passed to the
surviving wife because the husband's estate was bound to pay the price to the seller who
could enforce the contract against the husband's estate. Drew v. Martin, 2 H. & M. 130,
71 Eng. Rep. 411 (1864). There is some authority to the effect that husband and wife
could join in an action to protect jointly owned property. Jones v. Cuthbertson, 28 L.T.
(n.s.) 673 (1873) (defendant denied right of set-off against husband); Dunstan v. Burwell, l Wils. 224, 95 Eng. Rep. 586 (1748). Cf. Nelthrop v. Anderson, l Salk. 114, 91
Eng. Rep. 104 (1706) (husband and wife permitted to join in action of trover upon the
theory that the goods were held jointly and converted before marriage). Contra, 64 SELDEN
Soc., SELECT CASES IN THE Ex. CH. 6 (1461).
55 11 Beav. 485, 50 Eng. Rep. 905 (1849). Compare Steed v. Calley, 2 My. & K. 52,
39 Eng. Rep. 864 (1833) (where equity allowed wife to collect joint property while
husband was under disability).
56 14 Ch. Div. 506 (1880).
57 Id. at 516.
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decisions, but only for the life of the husband in the event the wife ·
survived.58
From this background of events entireties finally emerged as a kind
of family settlement affording economic security to the wife as well as
the husband in all types of property. But in any event entireties in
personal and real property disappeared in England with the Married
Women's Property Act of 188259 which had the effect of converting
the relation into a joint tenancy.6 ° Consequently, the British experience is valuable to us principally because the common misunderstanding of the evolutionary process by which it emerged undoubtedly led
to the divergent reception it has suffered in this country. It may be
some evidence, too, that the marriage partnership has long been popularly regarded as an institution for working out social security for the
mutual benefit of the partners.
2. General Statutory Provisions
In this country the legal attitude toward joint ownership by husband
and wife has been vitally affected by legislation. Statutes of three different sorts either directly or indirectly have played a most important
role. One of these was the married women's property laws which literally stripped from the husband and vested in the wife almost exclusive
control over her separate property. By a process of judicial legislation
in some states these acts were construed as destroying tenancy by the
entireties. 61 There was and is nothing in the general run of the legis58 Creditors of the husband were allowed to reach entireties personalty through the
husband's right of control during the lifetime of the parties. But there was some indication
that joint ownership of personal property may have been regarded as an indicia of fraud on
the husband's creditors since he held possession as apparent owner. Cf. Wordall v. Smith,
1 Camp. 332, 170 Eng. Rep. 976 (1808) (buyer and seller retained joint possession);
Glaister v. Hewer, 8 Ves. Jr. 195, 32 Eng. Rep. 329 (1802) (husband a trader); Taylor
v. Jones, 2 Atk. 601, 26 Eng. Rep. 758 (1743) (husband's "possession" of stock in which
wife and children held a reversionary interest a fraud on subsequent creditors); Stileman v.
Ashdown, 2 Atk. 477, 26 Eng. Rep. 688 (1742) (transfer of personalty from father to
father and son a fraud on subsequent creditors). See Christ's Hospital v. Budgin, 2 Vern.
683, 23 Eng. Rep. 1043 at 1044 (1712). But cf. Ramsay v. Margrett, 2 Q.B. 18 (1894)
(sale of household goods to wife by husband not a fraud on latter's creditors). See Campion
v. Cotton, 17 Ves. Jr. 263a, 34 Eng. Rep. 102 at 105 (1810).
159 45 & 46 Viet., c. 75.
60Re Jupp, 39 Ch. Div. 148 (1888). This legislation did not apply to interests
acquired before its enactment. However, the Law of Property Act converted all entireties
estates into joint tenancy. 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §39 (1925).
61 Connecticut was probably the first state which rejected the preference for entireties
ownership upon this ground. Compare Phelps v. Jepson, 1 Root (Conn.) 48 (1769), with
Whittlesey v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 337 (1836).
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lation specifically commanding this result. 62 Abolition was reasoned
upon the assumption that the purpose of the married women's property
laws was to divorce property ownership from the marriage relation-an
assumption quite beyond the general movement which was to give
women equality of rights with men. The common law precedeD:ts
clearly repel the idea that the estate was dependent upon the wife's
incapacity, since she could separately own realty and, in equity, personal property settled to her separate use. 63 Moreover, the husband as
well as the wife enjoyed and was bound by the major incidents
attached to entireties ownership.64 In a majority of jurisdictions entireties as a favorite of the law remained unaffected, except that these provisions logically were construed as giving the wife equality in the
control of entireties property. Thus both are necessary parties in actions
against third persons for injury to the property.65 As a general rule the
parties must join in a release or discharge of an obligation held by the
entireties. 66 Most courts now hold that rents and profits from entireties
property can be controlled and transferred only with the assent of both
62 Tennessee and Wisconsin are the only states where joint ownership by husband
and wife is given specific mention as a part of the married women's property legislation.
Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §8461; Wis. Stat. (1951) §246.03.
63 See authorities cited in note 34 et seq. The wife could hold property in joint tenancy
with third persons. Bracebridge v. Cook, 2 Plowd. 416, 75 Eng. Rep. 626 (1572).
A parallel difficulty arises in the community property states, where as a general rule
the husband is given control over community assets. That the scheme of community property laws could be continued without this type of marital subjugation, see Home, "Community Property-A Functional Approach," 24 So. CAL. L. R:Ev. 42 (1950).
64 Neither party could transfer his or her interest to defeat the other's right of survivor•
ship. Green ex dem. Crew v. King, 2 W. Bl. 1212, 96 Eng. Rep. 713 (1778). Therefore,
the contingent survivorship interest held by each was as valuable to the wife as to the
husband. Baker v. Stewart, 40 Kan. 442, 19 P. 904 (1888).
65Yarde v. Yarde, 117 Ind. App. 277, 71 N.E. (2d) 625 (1947) (W's guardian
necessary party in suit by H to recover possession of entireties realty); Wicker v. Trombly,
311 Mich. 262, 18 N.W. (2d) 817 (1945) (H could not enjoin trespass to realty without
joining W); Uzarski v. Union Nat. Bank, 152 Pa. Super. 433, 33 A (2d) 459 (1943)
(W could not collect bank account without joining Has party plaintiff). Contra, West v.
Aberdeen & R.F. R.R. Co., 140 N.C. 620, 53 S.E. 477 (1906) (only H could sue for
damages to entireties real estate). Cf. Sheldon v. Waters, (5th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d)
483; Sandler v. Wertleib, (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1948) 60 A. (2d) 222 (ejectment by H,
alone); Humbred v. Collings, 20 Ind. App. 93, 50 N.E. 314 (1898) (Hallowed to appeal
from special assessment); Foulke v. McIntosh, (Mo. App. 1950) 234 S.W. (2d) 805 (H
allowed to replevin fence posts); Goodrich v. Village of Otego, 216 N.Y. 112, 110 N.E.
162 (1915) (parties could sue individually for separate injuries to entireties real estate);
McGurk v. Moore, 234 N.C. 248, 67 S.E. (2d) 53 (1951) (W allowed to cancel lis
pendens notice against entireties realty).
·
66 French v. Nat. Relin. Co., 217 Ind. 121, 26 N.E. (2d) 47 (1940) (H, alone, could
not abrogate lease); Sparrow v. Mowers; 315 Pa. 460, 173 A. 273 (1934) (mortgagor's
conveyance to H did not discharge mortgage held by H and W); Schroeder v. Gulf Relin.
Co., 300 Pa. 397, 150 A. 663 (1930) (H's release of claim for negligent injucy to entireties house); Norris v. Monarch Fire Ins. Co., 180 Tenn. 660, 177 S.W. (2d) 831 (1944)
(agreement between insurer and W reducing amount of insurance on entireties property
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spouses.67 With but few exceptions enjoyment of entireties property
has become a mutual affair. 68 One would think that the married
women's property laws would have eliminated any doubt about the
ineffective). Cf. In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32, 21 A. (2d) 697
(1941) (power to vote entireties stock must be exercised by both); O'Boyle v. Home Life
Ins. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 33 (W could not borrow on entireties insurance
policy so as to defeat H's right of survivorship). Contra, Childs v. Childs, 293 Mass. 67,
199 N.E. 383 (1936) (power to receive payment of entireties contract vested exclusively in
the husband as at common law). Cf. Mann v. Etchells, 132 Fla. 409, 182 S. 198 (1938);
Merrill v. Adkins, 131 Fla. 478, 180 S. 41 (1938) (payment of entireties note to H
discharged obligation, but proceeds held by the entireties); McElroy v. Lynch, (Mo. 1950)
232 S.W. (2d) 507 (payment of entireties note to party in possession discharged obligation,
but payee accountable for proceeds); Hamrick v. Lasky, (Mo. App. 1937) 107 S.W. (2d)
201 (payment to one discharged obligation owned by entireties).
67Morgan v. Finnegan, (D.C. Mo. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 274 (income from entireties
realty taxed to parties "50-50"); Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 109 A. 418 (1920)
(H had no interest that could be reached by his creditors); American Wholesale Corp. v.
Aronstein, 56 App. D.C. 126, 10 F. (2d) 991 (1926) (H had no interest that could be
reached by his creditors); Richart v. Roper, 156 Fla. 822, 25 S. (2d) 80 (1946) (H could
not lease entireties realty alone); Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 S. 376
(1920) (individual creditors could not sequester rent); Patton v. Rankin, 68 Ind. 245
(1879) (crops from entireties realty not subject to execution by H's creditors); Hoffman
v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W (2d) 607 (1932) (rents and profits could not be reached
by individual creditors); Annapolis Banking & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 164 Md. 8, 164 A. 157
(1933) (H's creditors could not garnish rent); McCubbin v. Stanford, 85 Md. 378, 37 A.
214 (1897) (H's mortgagee could not obtain possession by foreclosure); American State
Trust Co. v. Rosenthal, 255 Mich. 157, 237 N.W. 534 (1931) (rents from entireties
property not subject to levy by H's creditors); Kingman v. Banks, 212 Mo. App. 202, 251
S.W. 449 (1923) (H's creditor could not attach rents from entireties realty); WinchesterSimmons Co. v. Cutler, 199 N.C. 709, 155 S.E. 611 (1930) (H's judgment creditor
acquired no lien on entireties real estate); O'Malley v. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 528, 116 A. 500
(1922) (rents and profits from entireties property divisible only after divorce); Beihl v.
Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 A. 953 (1912) (individual creditors could reach only the nontransferred contingency of survivorship); Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 25 A. (2d)
354 (1942) (H's creditors could not execute upon entireties realty); Sloan v. Sloan, 182
Tenn. 162, 184 S.W. (2d) 391 (1945) (H's grantee acquired no present interest); Cole
Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31 S.W. 1000 (1895) (individual creditors could not
reach rents and profits); Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E. (2d) 599 (1951)
(creditors of H could claim no interest in entireties property): Contra: Splaine v. Morrissey,
282 Mass. 217, 184 N.E. 670 (1933) (transfer of H's bank deposit to himself and W
was not a fraudulent conveyance because interest of husband subject to execution); Lewis
v. Pate, 212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937) (creditors of H allowed to execute upon
crops from entireties real estate). Cf. Arrand v. Graham, 297 Mich. 559, 298 N.W. 281,
rehearing den. 300 N.W. 16 (1941) (H retains right to control lease, and collect rents
from entireties property as against wife).
68 The entireties relation cannot be severed by one of the parties with the result that
the estate cannot be partitioned without the mutual assent of the owners. Hoag v. Hoag,
213 Mass. 50, 99 N.E. 521 (1912) (involving real estate); Kuntz v. Kuntz, 244 Mich. 78,
221 N.W. 285 (1928) (court refused right to an accounting of proceeds from Pennsylvania bank account held by the entireties, and invested by wife in Michigan realty);
Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S.W. 527 (1906) (court refused to divide proceeds from
entireties property); Vollaro v. Vollaro, 144 App. Div. 242, 129 N.Y.S. 43 (1911); Jones
v. W. A. Smith Co., 149 N.C. 318, 62 S.E. 1092 (1908). But cf. Schulz v. Ziegler, 80
N.J. Eq. 199, 83 A. 968 (1912) (partition between transferee of one spouse and other
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creation of entireties rights in personal property, in view of the fact that
its common law existence usually was theoretically denied upon the
ground that the wife lacked capacity to own personalty, and, therefore,
could not share it with her husband. Removal of the wife's disability
should have eliminated any technical obstacle to entireties ownership
of personal property. This thought seems to have been overlooked in
six states where entireties ownership of personal property is disfavored
although the opposite rule prevails in the case of real estate.
Another variety of legislation interfering with the creation of joint
rights between husband and wife are the community property laws.
Coming as it does from the civil law, one might reasonably expect to
find in community property a comprehensive substitute for the common law types of joint ownership available to husband and wife. However, most of the states with these laws recognize that community and
separate property of the spouses may be transmuted into tenancy in
common or joint tenancy. 69 A lack of convincing authority has left open
the question of whether or not tenancy by the entirety can exist. As
will be seen, joint tenancy and tenancy by the entireties are not favored
as a rule of construction. It appears, too, that some of the states prefer
community ownership over tenancy in common. To a large extent the
prejudice against the common law forms of co-ownership has been influenced by the preference for community in cases where the source of
the consideration is not accounted for, or where community assets are
allowed as to inter vivos rights). A few states, however, treat the rights of each tenant by
the entireties as severable-at least for some purposes. Franks v. Wood, 217 Ark. 10, 228
S.W. (2d) 480 (1950) (H could encumber one half rents and profits plus his contingency
of survivorship); Zanzonico v. Zanzonico, 24 N.J. Misc. 153, 46 A. (2d) 565 (1946)
(individual right of one spouse to possession, rents and profits passed on execution sale, but
not the possibility of survivorship); Finnegan v. Humes, 252 App. Div. 385, 299 N.Y.S.
501 (1937), affd. 277 N.Y. 682, 14 N.E. (2d) 389 (1938) (on execution sale by H's
creditor purchaser became tenant in common with W and also held a right of survivorship
if H survived W); Ganoe v. Ohmart, 121 Ore. 116, 254 P. 203 (1927) (H's creditor
allowed to reach one half of rents and profits plus his possibility of survivorship). Cf.
Whitelock v. Whitelock, 156 Md. 115, 143 A. 712 (1928) (disagreeing spouses each
awarded one half of income from entireties property which court ordered to be placed in
trust). See White v. White, (Fla. 1949) 42 S. (2d) 710 at 711 (income from entireties
adjusted in suit for separate maintenance). For an excellent analysis of the incidents of
entireties ownership see Phipps, "Tenancy by Entireties,'' 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 24 (1951).
69 The community property laws of three states affirmatively provide that husband and
wife may own property in joint tenancy or as tenants in common. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §§161, 683; Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) §3362; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §65-302.
In Washington, agreements with respect to community property to take effect upon the
death of either husband and wife are permitted by statute when in writing. Wash. Rev.
Code (1951) §26.16.120. Louisiana is the only state which refuses to recognize the common law joint estates. See note 169.
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employed to acquire property in the dual names of the parties.70 Hence,
the character of the funds used to acquire joint property is of special
importance in the community states.
The third kind of legislation, and undoubtedly the most important,
is that which purports to disfavor or abolish joint tenancy or the survivorship incident attached to that estate. Statutes of this type have
been adopted in all but five states71 and have been a powerful though
often unheralded force in producing what may best be described as a
judicial fetishism against the creation of survivorship rights in real and
personal property and in many cases between husband and wife. This
is a reversal of the common law rule which construed acquisitions in
the names of two or more persons as presumptively creating joint tenancy.72 Although the language of these laws, with but few exceptions,73
does not literally encompass tenancy by the entireties, some courts
nevertheless have expanded it to include this estate. 74 In states where
the married women's property laws were interpreted as displacing entireties the joint tenancy legislation was applied in pari materia so that
tenancy in common was preferred in construing transfers to husband
and wife. 75 However, decisions have given only cursory attention to
the wording of the joint tenancy legislation. For this reason a literal
evaluation of the statutes as applied to personal property and to husband
and wife may be of some usefulness.
70 For the special rules in the community states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington, see notes 114, 128, 155, 169, 129,
156, 157 and 158, respectively. A comparison of the case law in these jurisdictions will
reveal many subtle and conflicting distinctions. Although the husband retains managerial
powers over most of the community, both parties must join or assent to transfers of community into tenancy in common or joint tenancy. This leads to what might be termed an
inordinate amount of litigation concerned with presumptions and parol proof of agreements
between the parties. E.g., In re Baldwin's Estate, 50 Ariz. 265, 71 P. (2d) 791 (1937);
Socol v. King, 36 Cal. (2d) 342, 223 P. (2d) 627 (1950); In re Trimble's Estate, (N.M.
1953) 253 P. (2d) 805 (an excellent decision upon this problem); August v. Tillian, 51
N.M. 74, 178 P. (2d) 590 (1947); Munson v. Haye, 29 Wash. (2d) 733, 189 P. (2d)
464 (1948).
71 See Appendix II. The five states are Connecticut, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio and
Wyoming.
72E.g., Morley v. Bird, 3 Ves. Jr. 629, 30 Eng. Rep. 1192 (1798); 23 HARV, L.
REv. 214 (1909).
73 Tenancy by the entireties expressly is preserved only in Florida, Oregon and Tennessee. On the other hand entireties literally is disfavored only in Kentucky, Mississippi,
Oklahoma and West Virginia.
74 E.g., Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich. 425 (1877); Clark v. Clark, 56 N.H. 105 (1875);
Stout v. Van Zante, 109 Ore. 430, 219 P. 804, 220 P. 414 (1923); Green v. Cannady, 77
S.C. 193, 57 S.E. 832 (1907). In England, where joint tenancy is favored, the married
women's property laws had the effect of creating a preference for joint tenancy between
husband and wife. See note 60.
75 E.g., Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302 (1869); Wilson v. Wilson, 43 Minn. 398,
45 N.W. 710 (1890).
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Applicability of statutes to personal property. It is of interest to
note that, of the general statutes establishing a constructional preference for tenancy in common or purporting to abolish joint tenancy,
those in fifteen states apply to real estate or various interests in realty
thus leaving an inference that personal property was excluded.76 On
the other hand, the laws in sixteen literally encompass both realty and
personalty,77 and by fair construction the enactments in the remaining
thirteen states with such laws purport to include all classes of property
rights. 78 However these statutes seem to read, it is quite clear that the
policy of the legislation has been carried over to personal property in
practically every state in the Union either upon a broad interpretation
or upon reasoning by analogy.79 It is now too late to suggest that the
76 Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin.
See Appendix II, col. 2. A recent New Mexico statute includes mortgages. N.M. Stat.
Ann. (Supp. 1951) §75-134.
77 California, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and
West Virginia. See Appendix II, col. 2.
78 Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota and Washington. See Appendix II, col. 2.
79 illustrative cases from states with statutes applying only to real estate where it was
assumed or held that the laws apply to personalty: Greenwood v. Commissioner, (9th Cir.
1943) 134 F. (2d) 915 at 921 (Arizona); Eisenhardt v. Lowell, 105 Colo. 417, 98 P.
(2d) 1001 at 1002 (1940) (stock); Stetson v. Eastman, 84 Me. 366, 24 A. 868 (1892)
(bequest); Goldsmith v. Barron, 288 Mass. 176, 192 N.E. 509 (1934) (lessees); Wait v.
Bovee, 35 Mich. 425 at 429 (1877) (right of survivorship disfavored on the basis of "drift
of policy and opinion, as shown by legislation and judicial decisions"); Semper v. Coates,
93 Minn. 76, 100 N.W. 662 (1904) (right of action on promissory note to H and W
passed to survivor who was accountable to deceased's estate); Nichols v. Denny, 37 Miss. 59
at 64 (1859) (legacy); Pierce v. Baker, 58 N.H. 531 at 532 (1879) ("usage" under
statute applying to realty made for change in law as applied to personalty); Stout v. Van
Zante, 109 Ore. 430, 219 P. 804, 220 P. 414 at 415 (1923); Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah
181, 120 P. (2d) 327 (1941); Breitenbach v. Schoen, 183 Wis. 589, 198 N.W. 622
(1924). Contra: Emerson v. Cutler, 14 Pick. (31 Mass.) 108 (1833) (legacy). Cf.
Cookman v. Silliman, 22 Del. Ch. 303, 2 A. (2d) 166 (1938) (possibility of reverter held
not to be an "estate" within the meaning of the joint tenancy statute). See Diehm v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 129 Mo. App. 256, 108 S.W. 139 (1908); Dupont v. Jonet,
165 Wis. 554, 162 N.W. 664 (1917). The Wisconsin statute exempts "devises." Wis.
Stat. (1951) §230.45. In Farr v. Trustees of Grand Lodge, 83 Wis. 446, 53 N.W. 738
(1892), this exemption was applied by analogy to legacies.
Decisions disfavoring joint tenancy in states with statutes purporting to cover all classes
of property, but not expressly designating personalty: First Nat. Bank v. Lawrence, 212
Ala. 45, 101 S. 663 (1924); English v. Poole, 31 Ga. App. 581, 121 S.E. 589 (1924);
Abegg v. Hirst, 144 Iowa 196, 122 N.W. 838 (1909); Hand v. Heslet, 81 Mont. 68, 261
P. 609 (1927); Able-Old Hickory Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Polansky, 138 N.J. Eq. 232, 47
A. (2d) 730 (1946) (stock in names of H and W); Central Trust Co. v. Street, 95 N.J.
Eq. 278, 127 A. 82 (1923) (mortgage to husband and wife); In re Kimberly's Estate, 150
N.Y. 90, 44 N.E. 945 (1896) (legacy); Yard's Appeal, 86 Pa. 125 (1878) (to maintain a
"uniform interpretation"); Telfair v. Howe, 3 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 235 at 240 (1851); Lower
v. Lower, 48 S.D. 173, 203 N.W. 312 (1925); In re Ivers' Estate, 4 Wash. (2d) 477, 104
P. (2d) 467 (1940). But cf. Ehrlich v. Mulligan, 104 N.J.L. 375, 140 A. 463 (1928)
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omission of personalty from a substantial number of these enactments
may have been indicative of contrary legislative policy, and in fact there
appears to be no reason for a distinction between the two classes of
property. It is difficult to understand, however, why the judicial persistence in maintaining uniformity between the two types of property
has been ignored by those states recognizing and favoring entireties
ownership in real property but refusing to do so where personalty is
concerned.80
Special legislation affecting the creation of joint rights in particular
types of personal property will be found in some jurisdictions.81 Practically all of the states have acts purporting to regulate more or less comprehensively the rights of parties to joint bank accounts.82 Discussion
of these laws will be deferred inasmuch as their importance arises from
their effect upon the type of language necessary to create survivorship
rights and their relation to the law of gifts. However, it is significant
that the general statutes83 in eight states-Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey and Wisconsinliterally exclude joint mortgagees from the constructional preference
for tenancy in common. The exact meaning of these excepting provisos has not been made entirely clear by the case law. In Massachu(promissory note to "Hand W''); Camden Trust Co. v. Birch, 131 N.J. Eq. 542, 26 A.
(2d) 174 (1942) (legacy). In Arkansas, where one statute generally abolishes survivorship
rights and another allows joint tenancy in realty to be created by express language, it
apparently has been held that the latter also governs joint rights, in personalty. Compare
Ferrell v. Holland, 205 Ark. 523, 169 S.W. (2d) 643 (1943), with Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947)
§§50-411, 61-114.
80 Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Oregon. See notes
100-102, 136-138.
81 Statutes authorizing creation of joint tenancy in particular types of personalty: Colo.
Stat. Ann. (Repl. 1952) c. 92, §17 (any "security" as defined by the "Blue Sky Law'' in
names of two persons "as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, or as joint tenants
with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common" shall vest in the survivor); Mont.
Rev. Code (Repl. 1953)§67-309 ("the right in two or more persons to use or occupy any
safe or box ••• shall be a joint tenancy ••. and to pass to the survivors ••• under the terms
of the agreement"); Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §l701.34(D) ("corporate shares
issued to two or more persons with the words 'as joint tenants' or 'as joint tenants with right
of survivorship and not as tenants in common' " will create "a joint estate with the incidents of a joint estate as at common law, including the right of survivorship"). Special
legislation affecting husband-wife ownership in particular types of personalty will be found
in Indiana, New Jersey and Michigan. See notes 89, 106, 108, 109. Compare the statutes
cited in notes 214, 215.
82 The language of these laws is classified in Appendix ill. The effect of these statutes
upon the law of gifts will be considered in another paper.
83 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns Repl., 1951) §56-112; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 154, §13;
Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 184, §7; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.45; Minn. Stat. (1949)
§500.19(2); Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §834; N.J. Rev. Stat. Cum. Supp. (1952) §46:2D-l;
Wis. Stat. (1951) §230.45. See Appendix II, col. 5.
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setts84 and Michigan85 it has been held that the right to sue and collect
upon a mortgage naming two or more persons as joint m.vners passes to
the survivor, but that in equity the latter is under a duty to account to
the deceased's personal representative. In other words, joint mortgagees
presumptively hold as tenants in common except for procedural reasons
to facilitate collection and discharge of the mortgage. The Wisconsin
act has been construed as allowing parol proof to show whether or not
joint tenancy was intended. 86 Decisions will be found in Indiana87
and Minnesota88 where the statutory exemptions have been ignored
and, in absence of language showing that joint tenancy or survivorship
rights were intended, tenancy in common was preferred. Judicial construction of the laws apparently has not been made in Maine and Mississippi. The language of a recent New Jersey statute,89 which is applicable only as between husband and wife, leaves no doubt but that they
are presumed to hold mortgages in personal and real property as joint
tenants with right of survivorship. A plausible explanation for excepting joint mortgagees from the operation of the joint tenancy legislation
does not appear. It is quite probable that the early statutes were adopted
with an express purpose that they should be applied only to interests in
real estate, and the exemption of joint mortgagees possibly served as an
84Park v. Parker, 216 Mass. 405, 103 N.E. 936 (1914) (purchase money mortgage
to

"A, B and C" who were tenants in common of realty sold to mortgagor-held, executor

of last survivor authorized to collect obligation, but accountable to estates of others). Cf.
Rosen£eld v. Fine, 298 Mass. 356, 10 N.E. (2d) 265 (1937). Massachusetts favors tenancy
by the entireties with the result that mortgagees who are husband and wife are presumed
to hold as tenants by entireties. Pineo v. White, 320 Mass. 487, 70 N.E. (2d) 294 (1946)
(W could not release mortgage owned by H and W); Boland v. McKowen, 189 Mass. 563,
76 N.E. 206 (1905).
85 See Cooley v. Kinney, 109 Mich. 34, 66 N.W. 674 (1896) (dictum that survivor
could collect the mortgage, but held in trust for the other owner who is presumed to be a
tenant in common). Other cases have ignored the excepting statute to deny the right of
survivorship. Luttemoser v. Zeuner, ll0 Mich. 186, 68 N.W. ll7 (1896) (surviving
husband accountable for collections to wife's estate); Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich. 425 (1877).
By virtue of a subsequent statute, mortgages acquired by husband and wife are held by the
entireties or with a right of survivorship. Compare Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.2ll, with
Weiser v. Laszlo, 295 Mich. 133, 294 N.W. 122 (1940).
86Williams v. Jones, 175 Wis. 380, 185 N.W. 231 (1921) (joint note and mortgage
taken by co-owners in exchange for realty held as tenants in common). Since joint tenancy
between husband and wife is favored in personal property, husband and wife who hold a
note and mortgage jointly are presumptively joint tenants. In re Abddulah's Estate, 214
Wis. 336, 252 N.W. 158 (1934).
B7Radabaugh v. Radabaugh, 109 Ind. App. 352, 35 N.E. (2d) ll4 (1941) (note
and mortgage to H and W created tenancy in common); Collyer v. Cook, 28 Ind. App. 272,
62 N.E. 655 (1902) (note to "Hor W", mortgage to "H"-one half interest passed to wife
on H's death). Cf. Anderson Banking Co. v. Gustin, 84 Ind. App. 102, 146 N.E. 331
(1925) (note and mortgage to "Hand W"-H could not release wife's interest).
88 Cf. Delaney v. Fritz, 221 Minn. 190, 21 N.W. (2d) 479 (1946) (note and mortgage to "A and B"-payment to heirs of each discharged obligation).
89 See note 12.
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expression of purpose to follow the "lien theory" of mortgages by treating the rights of joint mortgagees as personal property.90 This would
indicate that the early statutes, which usually were limited to real estate,
were not intended to govern joint ownership of personalty, and that the
common law rule favoring joint tenancy and entireties ownership in
personal property was to control.91 Thus coherence in the law of property was m?-intained by the case law at the expense of evading what may
have been a contrary legislative purpose.
Statutes exempting husband and wife. A sympathetic attitude
toward marital joint ownership is reflected by legislation in nine states92
-Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, Tennessee,
Vermont and Wisconsin. Transfers to husband and wife are excluded
from the operation of the laws abolishing or disfavoring joint tenancy
or the incident of survivorship. However, the statutes of Florida,98
Oregon94 and Tennessee95 are specific in that tenancy by the entireties
90 An interesting problem arises where the obligation is made out to several persons in
one form, and the mortgage securing it in another. Compare Collyer v. Cook, 28 Ind. App.
272, 62 N.E. 655 (1902) (note to "H or W"-mortgage to H); In re Abddulah's Estate,
214 Wis. 336, 252 N.W. 158 (1934) (note to "H and W"-mortgage to H), with Lober
v. Dorgan, 215 Mich. 62, 183 N.W. 942 (1921) (note to "Hor W"-mortgage to "Hand
W, his wife, as joint tenants, with sole right to the survivor"). In the two previous cases,
the form of the note was controlling, while in the Lober case the form of the mortgage
governed the rights of the ·parties. Compare also Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 72 P.
(2d) 449 (1937) (mortgage to A and B as "joint tenants," note to "A and B"-rights of
parties resolved by parol evidence).
91 There is some evidence that equity did not favor joint tenancy between mortgagees.
Park v. Parker, 216 Mass. 405, 103 N.E. 936 (1914); Steeds v. Steeds, 22 Q.B. Div. 537
(1889) (one mortgagee could not discharge mortgage running to several); Petty v. Styward,
1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 290, 21 Eng. Rep. 1052 (1631). It is possible, however, that this rule
was limited to cases where the parties were partners. Cf. Jeffreys v. Small, 1 Vern. 217, 23
Ch. 424 (1683). Or where the mortgage was purchased with funds held by the parties in
common. Park v. Parker, supra; Williams v. Jones, 175 Wis. 380, 185 N.W. 231 (1921);
Robinson v. Preston, 4 K. & J. 505, 70 Eng. Rep. 211 (1858); Edwards v. Fashion, 1 Eq.
Ca. Abr. 292, 21 Eng. Rep. 1054 (1667-1744). Or where the parties contributed unequal
portions to the purchase price. Ridgen v. Vallier, 3 Atk. 731, 26 Eng. Rep. 1219 (1751);
Petty v. Styward, 1 Ch. Rep. 57, 21 Eng. Rep. 506 (1631) (different report of same case,
above). Or where the mortgage secures separate debts of the mortgagee. Burnett v. Pratt,
22 Pick. (Mass.) 556 (1839); Farwell v. Warren, 76 Wis. 527, 45 N.W. 217 (1890). Cf.
Simms v. Ramsey, 79 W.Va. 267, 90 S.E. 842 (1916). The rule did not apply to mortgages taken by husband and wife. Christ's Hospital v. Budgin, 2 Vern. 682, 23 Eng. Rep.
1043 (1712).
92 See Appendix II, col. 4.
98 In Florida the estate of tenancy by the entireties is exempted from the statute
creating a constructional preference against joint tenancy. Fla. Stat. (1951) §689.15.
94 Entireties is preserved by a statute adopted subsequent to legislation purporting to
abolish and disfavor joint tenancy in lands. Compare Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §91-030 with
Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§93.180, 105.820.
95 Entireties ownership maintained by the married women's property law. Tenn. Code
Ann. (Williams, 1934) §8461. For a period of time in Tennessee legal history tenancy by
the entirety was disapproved by legislation. Cf. Bost v. Johnson, 175 Tenn. 232, 133 S.W.
(2d) 491 (1939).
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expressly is preserved, whereas the remainder broadly purport to exclude
husband and wife from provisions relating to joint tenancy. Judicial
interpretation of these provisos has produced some amazing variations.
Of the nine states only Florida,96 Missouri, 97 Tennessee98 and Vermont99 favor entireties ownership in personal property. While entireties ownership of real estate is favored under the Indiana,1° 0 Michigan101 and Oregon102 statutes, the same result has not been extended
to personal property. Justification for this technical differentiation between personalty and realty seemingly is based on the fact that the
statutes in these states are confined to real estate.103 Consequently, the
decisions which prefer tenancy in common proceed upon a misconception that personal property could not be held by the entireties at common law.104 Cases in these jurisdictions contrast with those of Missouri
96 E.g., Hagerty v. Hagerty, (Fla. 1951) 52 S. (2d) 432 (checking account); Rader
v. First Nat. Bank, (Fla. 1949) 42 S. (2d) 1 (U.S. Treasw:y bonds); Merrill v. Adkins,
131 Fla. 478, 180 S. 41 (1938) (note and mortgage); Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103
S. 833 (1925) (bank deposits and mortgages).
01 E.g., Shields v. Stillman, 48 Mo. 82 (1871); State Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Coleman,
(Mo. App. 1951) 240 S.W. (2d) 188 (checking account); Wills v. Shepherd, (Mo. App.
1950) 231 S.W. (2d) 843 (automobile); Craig v. Bradley, 153 Mo. App. 586, 134 S.W.
1081 (1911), disapproving Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. 91, 73 S.W. 202 (1903) (holding to the contrary where both H and W contributed to consideration).
DBE.g., Sloan v. Jones, 192 Tenn. 400, 241 S.W. (2d) 506 (1951) (bank deposit
in names of "H or wife"); Campbell v. Campbell, 167 Tenn. 77, 66 S.W. (2d) 990
(1934); Smith v. Haire, 133 Tenn. 343, 181 S.W. 161 (1915) (bank account in the
names of "H or W').
99 George v. Dutton's Estate, 94 Vt. 76, 108 A. 515, 8 A.L.R. 1014 (1920) (proceeds
from entireties real estate traced to assets of partnership).
l00Koehring v. Bowman, 194 Ind. 433, 142 N.E. 117 (1924); Radabaugh v. Radabaugh, 109 Ind. App. 350, 35 N.E. (2d) 114 (1941) (note and mortgage payable to
h~band and wife); Collyer v. Cook, 28 Ind. App. 272, 62 N.E. 655 (1902) (promissory
note in names "H or W" held in common). However, property "directly derived from
real estate held by that title, as crops • • . or proceeds arising from the sale of property so
held" may be held as tenants by entireties. Patton v. Rankin, 68 Ind. 245 (1879) (crops);
Vonville v. Dexter, 118 Ind. App. 187, 76 N.E. (2d) 856, affd. on rehearing, 77 N.E. (2d)
759 (1948); Mercer v. Coomler, 32 Ind. App. 533, 69 N.E. 202 (1903).
101 Cooley v. Kinney, 109 Mich. 34, 66 N.W. 674 (1896). See cases cited in note 85.
102Entireties in personalty is disfavored. Manning v. U.S. National Bank of Portland,
174 Ore. 118, 148 P. (2d) 255 (1944) (stock); Holman v. Mays, 154 Ore. 241, 59 P.
(2d) 392 (1936) (checking account in names of "H or W' taxed as joint tenancy);
Nunner v. Erickson, 151 Ore. 575, 51 P. (2d) 839 (1935) (promissory note and mortgage
to "H and W' held as tenants in common); Mclnnis v. Atlantic Inv. Corp., 137 Ore. 648,
4 P. (2d) 314 (1931) (action for wrongful attachment of joint bank account must be
brought by both parties, although one survived). Cf. Webb v. Woodcock, 134 Ore. 319,
290 P. 751 (1930) (notes and mortgages to "Hand W or the survivor" held in common).
103 See Appendix II, col. 2. Note that in Indiana transfers to husband and wife are
excepted from the joint tenancy statute applying to real estate, but no such exemption is
included in the statute applying to personal property.
104 Abshire v. State ex rel. Wilson, 53 Ind. 64 at 68 (1876) (court assured parties that
thorough investigation made of authorities, and cited them without discussion); Stout v.
Van Zante, 109 Ore. 430, 219 P. 804, affd. on rehearing, 220 P. 414 (1923); Miller,
"Tenancy by the Entirety in Personal Property in Oregon," 3 Chm. L. REv. 163 (1924)
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and Vermont inasmuch as the statutes in both groups of states are
limited to interests in real estate.105 There is some reason to believe that
the restrictive effect given by the courts to the husband and wife exemptions in Indiana and Michigan have not been wholly approved. Recent
Indiana legislation requires that contracts and options to purchase, and
contracts to sell real estate in the names of husband and wife be construed
to create tenancy by the entirety.106 These statutes were passed with the
obvious purpose of nullifying the leading Indiana decision, Koehring v.
Bowman,101 enunciating a judicial prejudice against entireties ownership of personal property and holding that an option to purchase real
estate in the names of husband and wife made them tenants in common.
Special acts in Michigan seemingly favor entireties in certain types of
formal choses in action,1° 8 including contracts and mortgages acquired
in exchange109 for entireties land. A provision of the Wisconsin married women's property law purports to give the wife equal control over
real and personal property "held in joint tenancy with the husband."110
This was construed as abolishing entireties ownership by judicial reasoning to the effect that the words "joint tenancy" generically included
tenancy by the entireties thereby making the interest of both parties
(criticizing decision); 10 ORE. L. REv. 388 (1931). The landmark decision in Michigan
opposing entireties in personal property failed to consider the statute exempting husband
and wife from the statute disfavoring joint tenancy in real estate. Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich.
425 (1877).
105 Compare Appendix II, col. 2. The Michigan statute disfavoring joint tenancy
applies only to real estate, but the policy of the statute was extended to personalty. Wait v.
Bovee, 35 Mich. 425 (1877).
106 Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns Repl., 1951) §§56-901, 56-903. These provisions were
passed on March 1, 1951.
101194 Ind. 433, 142 N.E. 117 (1924).
10s The statute provides: "All bonds, certificates of stock, mortgages, promissory notes,
debentures, or other evidences of indebtedness •.• made payable to .•• husband and wife,
or made payable to them as endorsees or assignees, or otherwise, shall be held • • • subject
to the same ••• consequences .•• as are incident to the ownership of real estate held jointly
by husband and wife." Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.211. This statute has been construed
narrowly upon the ejusdem generis principle, thus excluding simple contract rights. McMahon v. Holland, 260 Mich. 246, 244 N.W. 462 (1932) (bank account in names of "H
or W" did not pass to survivor); Frank v. Patton, 251 Mich. 557, 232 N.W. 211 (1930)
(furniture sold to H and W did not establish entireties in absence of other agreement);
Hiller v. Olmstead, (6th Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 5 (fire insurance policy in names of "H
and W"). There is some indication that entireties rights may be created in property within
the terms of the statute where the intent to do so is expressed. Frank v. Patton, supra. But
see Scholten v. Scholten, 238 Mich. 679, 214 N.W. 320 (1927).
100 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.191. The statute has been given a narrow construction. Compare Hendricks v. Wolf, 279 Mich. 598, 273 N.W. 282 (1937) (husband sold
his separately owned land on contract running to Hand W-held, contract did not pass to
surviving wife), with Mundy v. Mundy, 296 Mich. 578, 296 N.W. 685 (1941) (husband
before marriage sold his land on contract, but after marriage deeded realty to third person
who reconveyed to "Hand W"-held, contract passed to surviving wife).
110 Wis. Stat. (1951) §246.03.
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transferable and converting all "joint tenancies" into what was at common law a technical joint tenancy. 111 Therefore the exemption of husband and wife from the statute disfavoring joint tenancy has had the
effect of making Wisconsin the only state where joint tenancy between
husband and wife openly is preferred.112 The rule applies to personal
property although this provision of the joint tenancy statute113 refers
only to "lands." The Arizona exemption in favor of husband and
wife has been construed in the light of the community property system
which has been adopted there. Transfers to husband and wife are
presumed to create community ownership in preference to the common
law estates of joint tenancy and tenancy by the entireties.114
Statutes applicable to husband and wife. The diverse attitudes of
the various legislatures is no better demonstrated than by the statutes
relating to joint tenancy. In contrast to the laws of the states just
considered, draftsmen were careful to include husband and wife within
the operation of general statutory provisions against joint ownership in
twelve jurisdictions115-Califomia, District of Columbia, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma,
lllAaby v. Kaupanger, 197 Wis. 56, 221 N.W. 417 (1928) (creditors of Hallowed
to reach his interest in promissory note payable to Hand W), overruling, Dupont v. Jonet,
165 Wis. 554, 162 N.W. 664 (1917); 27 MICH. L. REv. 475 (1929). Entireties, apparently, cannot be created by express language to that effect. In re Ray's Will, 188 Wis. 180,
205 N.W. 917 (1925). But cf. 4 Wrs. L. REv. 107 (1927) (criticizing rule).
112 In re Hounsell's Estate, 252 Wis. 138, 31 N.W. (2d) 203 (1948) (note and
mortgage and savings account in names of "H or W" created joint tenancy); Central Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Schumacher, 230 Wis. 591, 284 N.W. 562 (1939) (various securities
in names of husband and wife passed to survivor); In re Abddulah's Estate, 214 Wis. 336,
252 N.W. 158 (1934) (note payable to "Hand W"). Cf. Fielder v. Howard, 99 Wis. 388,
75 N.W. 163 (1898) (note and mortgage in names of "Hand W" passed to surviving wife
to exclusion of husband's creditors).
113 See Appendix II, col. 2.
114 Blackman v. Blackman, 45 Ariz. 374, 43 P. (2d) lOll (1935) (realty acquired
in names of Hand W with separate property). See La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15 Ariz.
200, 137 P. 426 (1914). Joint tenancy between husband and wife may be created where
an intent to do so is stated by the transfer instrument and assent by the parties thereto is
shown. Collier v. Collier, 73 Ariz. 405, 242 P. (2d) 537 (1952) (separate property of
· H deeded to H and W as joint tenants-assent established by indorsement sigued by H
and W that they intended to hold as "joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as
community property or as tenants in common"); Henderson v. Henderson, 58 Ariz. 514,
121 P. (2d) 437 (1942) (realty purchased with separate funds of wife); In re Baldwin's
Estate, 50 Ariz. 265, 71 P. (2d) 791 (1937) (realty deeded to H and W as joint tenants
purchased with community funds passed to surviving W only upon affirmative proof that
H assented to instrument); Greenwood v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 915
(transfer of husband's property to joint savings account, checking account and safe deposit
box created joint tenancy where both parties sigued joint tenanc)r agreement).
115 See Appendix II, col. 4. Of these states the statutes of Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts and Mississippi apply only to interests in land. Appendix II, col. 2. California
statutes expressly provide that husband and wife may hold property as joint tenants, tenants
in common or as community, and that community may be transmuted into joint tenancy
when "expressly declared in the transfer to be a joint tenancy." Compare Cal. Civ. Code
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Rhode Island, Virginia and West Virginia. Most of the statutes make
reference to property held by husband and wife as "joint tenants," and
do not specifically apply to tenancies by the entirety. However, the
laws of five states in words disfavor entireties ownership, but the language of these statutes (to be found ·in Kentucky,116 Mississippi,1 17
Montana,1 18 Oklahoma119 and West Virginia120 ) either expressly or
(Deering, 1949) §§161, 683. A Nevada statute provides that husband and wife may hold
real or personal property as joint tenants, tenants in common or as community. Nev. Comp.
Laws Ann. (Supp. 1931-1941) §3710.
116 Entireties may be created by express language. Hoffmann v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270,
60 S.W. (2d) 607 (1932) (real estate). Apparently, joint tenancy is disfavored in the
ownership of personalty. Cf. Perry v. Perry, 98 Ky. 242, 32 S.W. 755 (1895). However,
a right of survivorship may be created in personal property by language to that effect. Bishop
v. Bishop, 293 Ky. 652, 170 S.W. (2d) 1 (1943) (bank account in names of Hor W or
survivor passed to survivor-entireties not discussed).
117 That entireties may be created by express language, see Wolfe v. Wolfe, 207 Miss.
480, 42 S. (2d) 438 (1949) (realty to "H and his wife, W and to the survivor of them"
apparently created joint tenancy). There is some indication that joint tenancy may be
favored between husband and wife in bank accounts. Shearin v. Coleman, 201 Miss. 193,
28 S. (2d) 841 (1947) (in names of "Hor W').
118 "A tenancy by the entirety could be created only when the intention to create such
tenancy was clearly and unmistakably expressed." In re Marsh's Estate, 125 Mont. 239 at
243, 234 P. (2d) 459 (1951) (holding that savings bonds in co-ownership form with right
of survivorship were not held by the entireties); Emery v. Emery, 122 Mont. 201, 200 P.
(2d) 251 (1948); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §36-108 ("a husband and wife may
hold real or personal property together, jointly or in common").
119 Previous to the recent Oklahoma statute it had been held that tenancy by the
entireties was eliminated by the married women's property statutes. Helvie v. Hoover, 11
Okla. 687, 69 P. 958 (1902) (unless "upheld by special statute" entireties rejected).
While entireties ownership is authorized by the Oklahoma statute, it provides, "Nothing
herein contained shall prevent execution, levy and sale of the interest of the Judgment
debtor in such estates and such sale shall constitute a severance." Okla. Stat. (1951) tit.
60, §74. This creates some doubt as to whether the parties separately can convey or terminate the relation other than by creditor's proceedings. There is some indication from the
case law that joint tenancy is preferred over entireties. Kilgore v. Parrott, 197 Okla. 77,
168 P. (2d) 886 (1946) (deed to Hand W "and in the event of the death of either, then
the survivor" created joint tenancy). It is interesting to note that a policy favoring survivorship rights between husband and wife as to property acquired by their joint industry appears
in the inheritance laws. Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 84, §213. The statute may have some
force in favoring joint tenancy between husband and wife. Cf. Royston v. Besett, 183 Okla.
643, 83 P. (2d) 874 (1938).
120 That entireties may be created by express language, compare Irvin v. Stover, 67
W.Va. 356, 67 S.E. 1119 (1910) (deed to Hand W ~'as a homestead ••• and after them
to their heirs" created entireties in them for life, remainder to their heirs-decided on the
basis that a life estate was not an "estate of inheritance" to which the statute then applied),
with McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W.Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508 (1903) (indicating
that married women's statute and prior statute abolishing the right of survivorship between
husband and wife converted entireties into an estate of joint tenancy without survivorship).
In any event it has been clearly determined that survivorship rights may be created by
express language to that effect. Wisner v. Wisner, 82 W.Va. 9, 95 S.E. 802 (1918)
(savings account in names of H or W "either or the survivor").
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tacitly ratify the creation of the estate where an intent to do so is clearly
manifested by the transfer. The Rhode Island court has given the term
"joint tenancy" a common generic meaning to include tenancy by the
entirety, but a clearly expressed intent to create the latter will be given
effect.121 The legislative history preceding the adoption of the Kansas
statute indicates that it will receive the same construction.122 The Virginia law specially provides that transfers to husband and wife shall be
held as tenants in common unless a provision is included for survivorship.123 This has been interpreted as meaning that words of survivorship will establish an estate by entirety in preference to joint tenancy.124
On the other hand, the law of the District of Columbia125 and Massachusetts126 are read with technical nicety, so that the common law preference for tenancy by the entireties in both real and personal property
has not been affected by the statutes which apply to "joint tenancy."
Peculiarly, the esteem for entireties ownership in both of these states
exceeds predictable expectations, inasmuch as a transfer to husband
and wife "as joint tenants" is construed as making the parties tenants

121 Although the statute establishes a constructional bias against tenancy by the entireties, the estate may be created by language showing that intent. Bloomfield v. Brown,
67 R.I. 452, 25 A. (2d) 354, 141 A.L.R. 170 (1942). An intent to create "joint tenancy''
also will be given effect. Lawton v. Lawton, 48 R.I. 134, 136 A. 241 (1927). It is quite
probable that entireties rights may be created in personalty. Wilder v. Aldrich, 2 R.I. 518
(1853) (promissory note acquired in names of H and W passed to surviving wife before
married women's property law).
122 See note of the Judicial Council, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §58-501. Under a
previous statute purporting to abolish tenancy by the entireties, the estate was not favored.
Stewart v. Thomas, 64 Kan. 511, 68 P. 70 (1902). However, survivorship agreements
between husband and wife were given effect. Asche v. Matthews, 136 Kan. 740, 18 P.
(2d) 177 (1933) (bank account in W's name passed by parol agreement to surviving
husband).
123 The present statute applies to "joint tenant(s)," but transfers to husband and wife
are governed by a separate sentence providing that they hold "by moieties in like manner as
if a distinct moiety had been given to each by a separate conveyance." (Va. Code Ann.
(1950) §55-20. Under a prior statute it had been held that transfers to husband and wife
were not affected by legislation limited to "joint tenancy." Thorton v. Thorton, 3 Rand.
(24 Va.) 179 (1825).
124Burroughs v. Gorman, 166 Va. 58, 184 S.E. 174 (1936) (deed to Hand W "as
joint tenants with common law right of survivorship" created tenancy by the entireties).
Express intent that the parties are to hold by the "entireties" will also accomplish the same
result. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E. (2d) 599 (1951). In general see
Ritchie, "Tenancy by Entireties in Virginia," 28 VA. L. RBv. 608 (1942). It is quite
probable that personalty may be held by the entireties. McClanachan v. Siter, Price & Co.,
2 Gratt. (43 Va.) 280 (1845).
125 Settle v. Settle, (D.C. Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 911 (real estate); Flaherty v. Columbus, 41 App. D.C. 525 (1914) (personal property).
126 Phelps v. Simons, 159 Mass. 415, 34 N.E. 657 (1893) (leading decision favoring
entireties ownership in personalty-Holmes dissenting).
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by the entireties.127 Cilifomia128 and Nevada129 do not favor entireties,
seemingly because a comprehensive substitute for marital ownership has
been provided by the community property systems adopted there.

Statutes making no provision for husband and wife. Many of the
general statutory provisions favoring tenancy in common over joint tenancy fail to make special provision for acquisitions by married people
or tenancies by the entirety. Statutes of this kind will be found in
127 E.g., Settle v. Settle, (D.C. Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 911; Childs v. Childs, 293 Mass.
67, 199 N.E. 383 (1936).
128 Entireties ownership is not favored. Swan v. Walden, 156 Cal. 195, 103 P. 931
(1909) (indicating that estate could not exist). The preference for community property
coupled with the broad powers of husband and wife to convert separate property into
community and vice versa, has led to some rather curious presumptions as to dual ownership.
Property acquired by written transfer in which the parties are identified by marital status
presumptively is held in community. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §164; In re Kane's
Estate, 80 Cal. App. (2d) 256, 181 P. (2d) 751 (1947) (deed). Cf. Tompkins v. Bishop,
94 Cal. App. (2d) 546, 211 P. (2d) 14 (1949) (presumption rebutted by prior written
agreement that property was to remain separate). It seems that written acquisitions with
community funds in the names of husband and wife without designating their marital
status presumptively are held one-half by the wife as tenant in common, and one-half by
the husband as community. Cf. Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 296 P. 604 (1931)
(decided under prior statute); Caccamo v. Swanston, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 957, 212 P. (2d)
246 (1949) (automobile titled in names of H and W-decided only that W held one-half
as tenant in common); 20 CALIP. L. REv. 546 (1932); 5 So. CAL. L. REv. 144 (1931).
Compare further, Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340, 26 P. (2d) 477 (1933) (that property
was held as community proved by parol). Property acquired by husband and wife other
than by written instrument presumptively is held by community. Pacific T. & T. Co. v.
Wellman, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 151, 219 P. (2d) 506 (1950) (automobile registered in
names of H and W). An expressed intent to hold property as tenants in common will be
given prima facie effect. Saunders v. Saunders, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 133, 219 P. (2d) 28
(1950) (promissory note to H and W "each an undivided one-half interest as separate
property"). Where the transfer provides that the parties hold as joint tenants, joint tenancy
will be presumed. E.g., Socol v. King, 36 Cal. (2d) 342, 223 P. (2d) 627 (1950) (property purchased with joint tenancy funds presumptively held in joint tenancy); Siberell v.
Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 7 P. (2d) 1003 (1932); Cox v. Cox, 82 Cal. App. (2d) 867, 187
P. (2d) 23 (1947) (funds from joint tenancy realty); Wallace v. Riley, 23 Cal. App. (2d)
654, 74 P. (2d) 807 (1938). Parol, however, may be introduced to show that the property
is held as community. Sandrini v. Ambrosetti, 111 Cal. App. (2d) 439, 244 P. (2d) 742
(1952) (real and personal property); Turknette v. Turknette, 100 Cal. App. (2d) 271,
223 P. (2d) 495 (1950); Perdicalis v. Perdicalis, 92 Cal. App. (2d) 274, 206 P. (2d)
650 (1949) (evaluating prior decisions); Luminoso v. Luminoso, 75 Cal. App. (2d) 472,
171 P. (2d) 516 (1946) (promissory note running to H and W). Paro! evidence is
admissible to show that property acquired in the names of husband and wife is separate
property of one. Huber v. Huber, 27 Cal. (2d) 784, 167 P. (2d) 708 (1946) (parol
admitted to impeach joint tenancy deed on theory of constructive trust-W was informed
of H's purpose not to create joint tenancy). Cf. Trimble v. Coffman, 114 Cal. App. (2d)
618, 251 P. (2d) 81 (1952) (no proof of resulting trust in H who furnished consideration
from his separate property).
129 Survivorship rights in·personalty must be designated by a written transfer or agreement. Newitt v. Dawe, 61 Nev. 472, 133 P. (2d) 918 (1943) (note to "H or W" held
as tenants in common-decision not clear whether note purchased with community property).
Separate property of one spouse invested in the names of both presumptively retains its
character as separate property. Barrett v. Franke, 46 Nev. 170, 208 P. 435 (1922) (contract
to sell husband's realty, and bank deposits-contention of gift, however, was not raised).
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twenty-three states180-Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and
Washington. Of this group, decisions in Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Pennsylvania
hold that the laws were not intended to encompass transfers to husband
and wife thereby preserving the common law priority for tenancy by
the entireties.181 Entireties ownership of personal property is favored
in Arkansas,1 32 Delaware,1 83 Maryland134 and Pennsylvania135 where
the estate has been elevated to a position of unquestioned popularity.
However, New Jersey,1 36 New York137 and North Carolina188 limit
130 See Appendix II, col. 4. The community property law of New Mexico provides
that husband and wife may hold property "as joint tenants, tenants in common or as community," and establishes special presumptions where property is taken in the dual names
of husband and wife. N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §65-302; N.M. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1951)
§65-401. A Washington statute authorizes written survivorship agreements respecting community property. Wash. Rev. Code (1951) §26.16.120.
131 See notes 132-141.
182 E.g., Cross v. Pharr, 215 Ark. 463, 221 S.W. (2d) 24 (1949) (checking account
in names of "Hor W"); Union & M. Trust Co. v. Hudson, 147 Ark. 7, 227 S.W. 1 (1921)
(checking account in the form "H and W"); Black v. Black, 199 Ark. 609, 135 S.W. (2d)
837 (1940).
133 E.g., Hoyle v. Hoyle, 31 Del. Ch. 64, 66 A. (2d) 130 (1949) (savings account);
In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32, 21 A. (2d) 697 (1941) (stock in names
of husband and wife); Rauhut v. Reinhart, 22 Del. Ch. 431, 180 A. 913 (1935) (mortgage).
,134 E.g., Weir v. Baker, 181 Md. 249, 29 A. (2d) 269 (1942) (motor trucks); In re
Bauernschmidt's Estate, 97 Md. 35, 54 A. 637 (1903) (stock in names of "H and W,
wife, as joint tenants"); Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 48 A. 1060 (1901) (bank
account).
135 E.g., Alcorn v. Alcorn, 364 Pa. 375, 72 A. (2d) 96 (1950) (savings bonds in
co-ownership form); Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 A. 624
(1938); Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 A. 172 (1934); Parry's Estate, 188 Pa.
33, 41 A. 448 (1898) (traveler's checks).
136 The statute disfavoring joint tenancy is not applicable to husband and wife who
acquire interests in realty. Cadgene v. Cadgene, 17 N.J. Misc. 332, 8 A. (2d) 858 (1939)
(held as tenants by entirety). But the policy of the statute applies to acquisitions of personalty by married people. Able-Old Hickory Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Polansky, 138 N.J.
Eq. 232, 47 A. (2d) 730 (1946) (stock); Central Trust Co. v. Street, 95 N.J. Eq.
278, 127 A. 82 (1923) (mortgage). But cf. Siesel v. Mandeville, 140 N.J. Eq. 490, 55 A.
(2d) 167 (1947) (contract by H and W to purchase real estate held by the entireties);
Ehrlich v. Mulligan, 104 N.J.L. 375, 140 A. 463 (1928) (note payable to "H and W"
passed to survivor for purposes of collection).
137 That the joint tenancy statute does not apply to entireties in real estate, see Bertles
v. Nunan, 92 N.Y. 152 (1883). Although entireties is not favored in personalty, the rule
is not without exception. Thus proceeds received upon forced sale of entireties realty are
held by the entireties. In re II5th and Vistula Avenues, 137 Misc. 358, 242 N.Y.S. 6
(1930); Stretz v. Zolkoski, 118 Misc. 806, 195 N.Y.S. 46 (1922). But cf. In re Blumenthal's Estate, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 (1923) (bond and mortgage received from sale
of entireties property held in common). Contracts to purchase realty are held by the
entireties. Matter of Beecher, 151 Misc. 395, 271 N.Y.S. 446 (1934).
138 Although entireties is favored in real estate, the statute abolishing joint tenancy
has been construed as applicable to acquisitions of personal property. Wilson v. Ervin, 227
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the preference for entireties to realty upon the spoken, but questionable
belief that the estate in personalty did not exist at common law. A
radical departure from this position appears in a recent New Jersey
statute providing that mortgages held by husband and wife shall be
held in joint tenancy. 139 New York has accepted the odd principle that
choses in action standing in the names of husband and wife pass to the
survivor, but the rule is limited to cases where it is proved that the consideration was furnished by the husband.140 The precise characteristics
of this relation differ from those of entireties and joint tenancy insofar
as it seems that the husband retains the power to revoke the relation
during his lifetime.141 Apparently, it is a peculiar kind of ownership
which can be traced back to the common law right of the husband to
reduce his wife's choses in action to his possession, and is confined to
the boundaries of New York. Dual ownership is unaffected by the
marital status of the parties in Alabama,1 42 Colorado,1 43 Georgia,1 44
Illinois 145 Iowa 146 Maine 147 Minnesota 148 New Hampshire 149 South

'

'

'

'

'

N.C. 396, 42 S.E. (2d) 468 (1947) (proceeds from entireties real estate presumptively
held as tenants in common in absence of agreement to the contrary); 13 N.C.L. RBv. 256
(1935); 6 N.C.L. RBv. 342 (1928). Compare Motley v. Whitemore, 19 N.C. 537 (1837)
(statute abolishing joint tenancy did not apply to tenancy by the entirety). It has been
held that an intent to create tenancy by the entireties is a nullity. Winchester-Simmons
Co. v. Cutler, 194 N.C. 698, 140 S.E. 622 (1927) (bequest to Hand W "as tenancy by
entireties" created tenancy in common). It is doubtful that the latter case would be
respected in the light of other decisions holding that a right of survivorship may be provided for. Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N.C. 178, 7 S.E. (2d) 366 (1940) (stock); Taylor v.
Smith, 116 N.C. 531, 21 S.E. 202 (1895) (oral survivorship agreement upheld between
two payees of promissory note).
1so N.J. Rev. Stat. Cum. Supp. (1952) §46:2D-l.
14DThe leading cases are In re Blumenthal, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 (1923);
Matter of Albrecht, 136 N.Y. 91, 32 N.E. 632 (1892).
141Jn re Kane's Estate, 246 N.Y. 498, 159 N.E. 410 (1927), a!Id. on rehearing,
247 N.Y. 219, 160 N.E. 17 (1928). In general see notes 157-161.
142 See First National Bank v. Lawrence, 212 Ala. 45, 101 S. 663 (1924) (indicating
that entireties eliminated by joint tenancy statute, but held that checking account in names
of H and W, "either" to draw, passed to survivor).
143 Whyman v. Johnston, 62 Colo. 461, 163 P. 76 (1917) (entireties in realty rejected
because of married women's property statute). An intent to create joint tenancy in personalty
will be given effect. Eisenhardt v. Lowell, 105 Colo. 417, 98 P. (2d) 1001 (1940) (stock).
144 Cf. Lott v. Wilson, 95 Ga. 12, 21 S.E. 992 (1894) (transfer to Hand W held in
common if made after "Woman's Law").
145 Lawler v. Byrne, 252 ill. 194, 96 N.E. 892 (1911); Cooper v. Cooper, 76 ill. 57
(1875) (entireties disfavored upon basis of married women's property acts); Smith, "Tenancy by the Entirety in illinois," 14 Cm.-KENT L. RBv. 1 (1935). Joint tenancy may be
created in personal property where an intention to do so is expressed in the creating instrument. Hood v. Commonwealth Trust & Sav. Bank, 376 ill. 413, 34 N.E. (2d) 414 (1941)
(stock). By statute both parties must join as signatories to the deposit agreement in order
to create the estate in a bank account. ill. Ann. Stat. (Supp. 1953) c. 76, §2; Doubler v.
Doubler, 412 ill. 597, 107 N.E. (2d) 789 (1952).
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Carolina,1 150 South Dakota151 and Utah1152 where tenancy in common
is preferred, at least in the absence of a contrary intent expressed by
the transfer. This result usually is justified by the policy inferred from
the married women's property acts, although several courts have tended
to include tenancy by the entirety within the generic meaning of "joint
tenancy."153 Some of the statutes are literally restricted to interests in
land but, as previously demonstrated,1 54 the practice has been to extend
the language to include personal property. Hence, neither joint tenancy
nor tenancy by the entireties in personalty is favored in these states.
146 Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302 (1869) (entireties rejected upon the policy expressed by both the joint tenancy legislation and the married women's property acts); 12
IowA L. R:sv. 415 (1927). Express language showing an intent to create entireties has been
held ineffective. Fay v. Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N.W. 369 (1926) (deed by H directly
to H and W as tenants by entirety and not as "tenants in common" created tenancy in
common-transfer contrary to "four unities rule"). This case, in effect, was overruled by
Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 23 N.W. (2d) 837 (1946), holding that deed from husband
to husband and wife as "joint tenants" did not violate the "four unities" rule. The recent
tendency of the Iowa court has been to liberalize the technical impediments interfering
with the establishment of survivorship rights. E.g., O'Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11
N.W. (2d) 412 (1943) (parol evidence admissible to show that savings account in names
of "H or W" held in joint tenancy).
147 Appeal of Robinson, 88 Me. 17, 33 A. 652 (1895) (entireties disfavored under
married women's property act). The estate is not recognized in personalty. Cf. Appeal of
Garland, 126 Me. 84, 136 A. 459 (1927) (savings deposit).
148 Wilson v. Wilson, 43 Minn. 398, 45 N.W. 710 (1890) (entireties superseded by
policy of both the joint tenancy statute and the married women's property act). The same
rule has been applied to personalty. Semper v. Coates, 93 Minn. 76, 100 N.W. 662 (1904)
(promissory note in names of H and W passed to survivor, but survivor accountable to
deceased's estate). Joint tenancy may be established where an intent to do so has been
expressed. Peterson v. Lake City Bank & Trust Co., 181 Minn. 128, 231 N.W. 794
(1930) (joint tenancy in bearer bonds established by parol).
149 Clark v. Clark, 56 N.H. 105 (1875) (tenancy in common favored under policy
of married women's property legislation); 11 BosT. Umv. L. R:sv. 239 (1931). An intent
to create joint tenancy will be enforced. Cf. Therrien v. Therrien, 94 N.H. 66, 46 A (2d)
538 (1946) (realty).
1150 Green v. Cannady, 77 S.C. 193, 57 S.E. 832 (1907) (realty held in common upon
basis of married women's property legislation). In Davis v. Davis, 223 S.C. 182, 75 S.E.
(2d) 46 (1953), a deed to husband and wife as tenants by the entirety created a life estate
in both with a contingent remainder to the survivor.
151 Cf. Armstrong v. Hellwig, 70 S.D. 406, 18 N.W. (2d) 284 (1945) (deed to H
and W and to "survivor" created joint tenancy). Apparently, tenancy by entirety is not
favored in choses in action. Lower v. Lower, 48 S.D. 173, 203 N.W. 312 (1925) (savings
deposit to "H or Mrs. H").
152 While entireties ownership or joint tenancy are not favored, the latter may be
created when provided for. Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P. (2d) 327 (1941) (savings account held by husband and wife as joint tenants only where expressly provided forupon basis of joint tenancy statute); Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 63 Utah 353, 225 P.
1089 (1924) (survivorship rights to checking account in names of "H or W" established
by parol).
153 See notes 141, 145, 147.
154 See note 79.
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Idaho,1 5 5, New Mexico,156 Texas157 and Washington158 have had some
difficulty in reconciling the various common law forms of co-ownership
with community property. Joint tenancy and t~nancy by the entireties,
however, are not favored. The status of marital ownership apparently
has not been resolved in North Dakota.159
States without joint tenancy legislation. Five states, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio and Wyoming, are without legislation pertaining to joint ownership.16° Connecticut was probably the first state
155 Property taken in the names of husband and wife presumptively is community.
Bear Lake State Bank v. Wilcox, 48 Idaho 147, 279 P. 1090 (1929) (contract to purchase
realty in the names of Hand W purchased with separate and community funds).
156 The New Mexico court has found it extremely difficult to reconcile the common
law forms of co-ownership with community. In fact some of the decisions in that state are
the best examples of creative nonsense to be found anywhere. As things now stand it
appears that property acquired in the names of husband and wife ( without other expressed
intention) presumptively is held one half by the wife as tenant in common, the other half
in community, except that if the transfer is by written instrument describing the parties
as husband and wife presumptively the whole is held by community. N.M. Stat. Ann.
(Supp. 1951) §65-401; August v. Tillian, 51 N.M. 74, 178 P. (2d) 590 (1947). Where
property is acquired in joint tenancy form with community assets, "proof to support such
transmutation must be clear, strong and convincing." Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393,
244 P. (2d) 781 (1952). As a consequence it seems substantial proof is required to show
that both parties assented to a transfer in joint tenancy. In re Trimble's Estate, (N.M.
1953) 253 P. (2d) 805 (admission by surviving W that she did not know that deed was
taken in joint tenancy supported presumption that property was held in communitydecided under a prior statute and over a very excellent dissenting opinion). What the law
is or will be where property is purchased in the joint names of husband and wife with
separate property is a mystery. Formerly, a transfer of separate property to husband and
wife did not pass to the community, but was held in joint tenancy or in common "as the
facts would warrant." McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 85 P. (2d) 78 (1938) (decided
upon the basis that transmutation was legally impossible-since overruled by the Chavez
case, supra). There is dictum to the effect that entireties cannot be created. McDonald v.
Senn, 53 N.M. 198, 204 P. (2d) 990 (1949). This conclusion is weakened by the
Chavez and Trimble cases, cited above.
157 Property taken in the names of husband and wife during marriage is community
property. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1951) art. 4619. However, community property
may be held in joint tenancy by express agreement. Shroff v. Deaton, (Tex. Civ. App.
1949) 220 S.W. (2d) 489 (savings and loan shares taken by Hand Was "joint tenants"
passed to surviving wife). Gifts to husband and wife by third persons, or transfers of separate property cannot be made to the community, but are held in common in absence of
other intent. 28 TEX. L. REv. 275 (1949); 18 TEX L. REv. 227 (1940).
158 Property acquired in the names of husband and wife presumptively is held in community. Munson v. Haye, 29 Wash. (2d) 733, 189 P. (2d) 465 (1948) (community
funds deposited in names of Hand W); In re Hickman's Estate, 41 Wash. (2d) 519, 250
P. (2d) 524 (1952) (joint bank account). Cf. Mabie v. Whittaker, IO Wash. 656, 39
P. 172 (1895). Joint tenancy may be created in community property by agreement. In re
Ivers' Estate, 4 Wash. (2d) 477, 104 P. (2d) 467 (1940) (community assets invested in
joint and several names of parties). Cf. In re Dunn's Estate, 31 Wash. (2d) 512, 197 P.
(2d) 606 (1948). Separate property invested in the joint names of the parties presumptively
continues as separate property of the spouse furnishing the consideration. Cf. In re Hickman's Estate, supra, (H and W parties to contract selling H's realty).
159 That joint tenancy may be created by express language, compare First Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Green, 66 N.D. 160, 262 N.W. 596 (1935) (brother and sister).
160 Special statutes relating to joint bank accounts will be found in these states. See
Appendix III. Joint tenancy in stock is authorized by an Ohio statute. Ohio Rev. Code
(Baldwin; 1953) §1701.34.
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by decision to repudiate the common law rule preferring joint tenancy,161 and transfers to husband and wife were and are included within
this doctrine.162 In fact the judicial feeling reached such intensity that
for a period in Connecticut legal history it was doubtful that the estate
could be created at all. It has since been held that a common law joint
tenancy can be created where an intent to do so is clearly expressed,1 63
but Connecticut has the dubious distinction of consistently construing
survivorship language ( without m~re) as establishing tenancy in common with a contingent remainder to the survivor.164 Nebraska165 and
Ohio,1 66 likewise, disfavor joint tenancy and tenancy by the entireties,
although joint tenancy or a right of survivorship may be provided for
161 ''ny this decision the doctrine of survivorship between joint tenants, was exploded•
• • •" Phelps v. Jepson, 1 Root (Conn.) 48 at 49 (1769).
162Blodgett v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 111 Conn. 165, 149 A. 790 (1930)
(stock).
163 Peyton v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 6 A. (2d) 313 (1939) (bequest to beneficiaries "as joint tenants and not severally nor as tenants in common, with the right of
survivorship expressly vested in said joint tenants").
164 McLaughlin v. Cooper's Estate, 128 Conn. 557, 24 A. (2d) 502 (1942) (bank
account); Blodgett v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., Ill Conn. 165 at 167-168, 149 A.
790 (1930) ("••• a gift to A and B, the survivor to take the whole absolutely, will be
construed to give A and B estates in common with a right in the survivor to take the whole
as a remainder interest"); Houghton v. Brantingham, 86 Conn. 630, 86 A. 664 (1913)
(bequest "on condition ••• that the goods ••• shall be delivered up and become the property of the survivors of them").
165 Entireties is disfavored under the married women's property law, so that tenancy
in common is preferred. Kerner v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 663, 84 N.W. 92 (1900) (realty).
An intent to create "joint tenancy" will be enforced. In re Vance's Estate, 149 Neb. 220,
30 N.W. (2d) 677 (1948) (stock issued to Wand H); Sanderson v. Everson, 93 Neb.
606, 141 N.W. 1025 (1913) (deed to H and W "as joint tenants with right of survivorship"). Mere words of survivorship, however, will be construed as creating a joint life
estate with contingent remainder to the survivor. Arthur v. Arthur, 115 Neb. 781, 215
N.W. 117 (1927) (partition of realty owned by Hand W "and the survivor of them" did
not affect the fee). Survivorship in bank accounts, however, is favored. Scriven v. Scriven,
153 Neb. 655, 45 N.W. (2d) 760 (1951) (deposit in names of "H or W").
166 Entireties rights in real and personal property are not recognized. Farmers &
Merchants Nat. Bank v. Wallace, 45 Ohio St. 152, 12 N.E. 439 (1887) (realty); Kipp
v. Kipp, (Ohio App. 1950) 101 N.E. (2d) 782 Goint bank account). Joint tenancy or
survivorship rights between husband and wife are not favored. Gladieux v. Farney, 93
Ohio App. 117, 106 N.E. (2d) 317 (1951) (United States savings bonds in names of
"H or W' did not pass to survivor-regulations establishing contract were not proved);
Foraker v. Kocks, 41 Ohio App. 210, 180 N.E. 743 (1931) (certificate of deposit
issued in names of H or W, and United States registered bond in joint names of parties
held as tenants in common-"If a joint tenancy is expressed without words of survivorship,
under the unbroken line of authorities in Ohio it will be considered as a tenancy in common"). But cf. In re Fulk's Estate, 136 Ohio St. 233, 24 N.E. (2d) 1020 (1940) (parol
admitted to show that savings account in names of "H or W" acquired under survivorship
agreement). A right of survivorship may be created by "contract," but the Ohio decisions
seem to favor joint ownership with a contingent remainder to the survivor over a common
law joint tenancy. E.g., compare Berberick v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297, 28 N.E. (2d)
636 (1940) (surviving wife took survivorship deposits by force of "contract" and not by
"gift" so that "half-and-half" statute did not apply); In re Hutchinson's Estate, 120 Ohio St.
542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929) (stock in names of Hand Was "tenants in common remainder
to survivor" created "vested remainder in the surviving wife"). See also Foraker v. Kocks,
supra.
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by express language. Entireties ownership of realty is preferred in
Wyoming,167 ·but whether or not it will be favored or recognized in
personal property has been left as an open question by the Wyoming
court.168 The common law concepts of dual ownership have quite uniformly been rejected as incompatible with the civil law in Louisiana.169
General effect of the legislation. The numerous occasions in which
courts have had an opportunity to apply and construe the statutes
opposing joint tenancy and to shape attitudes toward marital ownership
enables one to predict with some degree of certainty the basic policy
adopted by almost all of the states toward the problem. Of the fortyfour states with joint tenancy legislation, husband and wife are exempted
in nine, included within the scope of the laws of twelve, and are not
mentioned in the remaining twenty-three. In the nine states exempting
husband and wife, tenancy by the entireties is favored in seven (three
of which do not extend the rule to personalty), joint tenancy is preferred in one, and acquisitions by husband and wife in the other, apparently, are presumed to be held in community. Of the twelve with statutes including husband and wife, two states hold that the statutes refer
to the technical estate of "joint tenancy" thereby favoring entireties as
it was at common law, and the preference for tenancy in common in
the other two is affected by peculiar presumptions arising out of the
community property system. Out of the twenty-three jurisdictions with
laws failing to consider rights of husband and wife, seven indulge in
the presumption of entireties ownership (three of which favor tenancy
in common in personalty), eleven prefer tenancy in common, in four
co-ownership has been affected by varying principles oscillating between
common and community ownership, and no interpretation has been
167Peters v. Dona, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 P. (2d) 817 (1936); Housel, "Tenancy by
Entirety in Wyoming," 3 WYo. L.J. 66 (1948).
168 Hill v. Breeden, 53 Wyo. 125, 79 P. (2d) 482 (1938) (promissory note payable to
Hand W-held, that the right to discharge the obligation passed to the surviving wife, but
the court did not decide whether or not she would be accountable to H's estate for any part
of the proceeds).
169 A gift of joint survivorship rights in incorporeal rights has been denied on the
ground that such is a testamentary disposition. Northcott v. Livingood, (La. App. 1942)
IO S. (2d) 401. If it is possible to create such interests, the survivor takes subject to the
civil law rules of community and forced inheritance. Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31
S. (2d) 609 (1947) (United States bonds in co-ownership form passed to survivor, subject
to rights of other heirs to collations and legitime). Cf. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La.
398, 56 S. (2d) 730 (1952) (after-born child could not be defeated by donor who purchased savings bonds in the ''P.O.D." form with his brother); Succession of Geagan, 212
La. 574, 33 S. (2d) 118 (1947) (widow traced community funds to bonds purchased by
deceased husband with son as beneficiary). But cf. Succession of Tanner, (La. App. 1946)
24 S. (2d) 642 (co-ownership bonds purchased by H with community passed to surviving
wife who was not required to pay inheritance tax).
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made of the laws in one. Joint ownership, also, has received varied
treatment in the five states without legislation upon the subject. Tenancy by the entireties is favored in one, tenancy in common in three,
and dual ownership is affected by the sensitive rules of community
property in the other.
This array of authority does more than provide a picture of predictability from which a lawyer can calculate his plans in draftsmanship and litigation. It also furnishes a periphery for critical analysis.
The general sweep of the legislation and case law presents a good
example of non-uniformity in an area of property law where a legal
student might expect to find some stability dictated by an accepted
policy designed to maintain the marital unity. The conflict appears to
have arisen out of two surging forces which spread across the country
at approximately the same period in legal history. One of these was the
legislation opposed to the survivorship incident of joint tenancy. 170 The
other was the legislation giving married women equal rights in the ownership and control of their property. Neither was deliberately intended
to affect joint ownership by husband and wife, a fact which is demonstrated from the majority practice of excluding or omitting husband
and wife from the terms of the joint tenancy statutes and the omission
of joint tenancy or entireties from the married women's property laws.
The failure of judges and even legislatures to settle upon a consistent
solution of the joint ownership problem, therefore, may be attributed
to a lack of information as to why dual ownership is such a common
institution between husband and wife. The legal experience of the
past hundred years provides evidence that the successful marriage relation is in some degree correlated to economic equality and security.
This is witnessed by the large number of cases in which joint owner170 It seems that the first legislation overruling the common law preference for joint
tenancy was adopted in North Carolina (and Tennessee) in 1784. Thereafter, similar laws
spread throughout the colonial territory-to Massachusetts in 1785, New York in 1786,
Virginia in 1787, South Carolina in 1791, Kentucky in 1796, Vermont in 1797, Rhode
Island in 1798, New Hampshire in 1809, New Jersey and Pennsylvania in 1812, Delaware
in 1816, Maine in 1821, Maryland in 1822 and Georgia in 1828. These dates are established from historical references in decisions and current statutes. Compare Kunz v. Kurtz,
8 Del. Ch. 404, 68 A. 450 (1899); Lowe v. Brooks, 23 Ga. 325 (1857) (tracing the
change back to obscure language in the Ga. Const. of 1787); Truesdell v. White, 13 Bush
(76 Ky.) 616 (1878); Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402 (1878); Crooker v. Crooker, 46 Me.
250 (1858); Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 184, §7 (historical note); Stilphen v. Stilphen,
65 N.H. 126, 23 A. 79 (1889); Sentliffer v. Jacobs, 84 N.J.L. 128, 86 A. 929 (1913);
N.Y. Laws (1786) c. 12; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1950) §41-2 (historical note); Pa. P.L.,
c. 194, 259 (1811-1812); Van Ausdall v. Van Ausdall, 48 R.I. 106, 135 A. 850 (1927);
M'Meekin v. Brummet, 2 Hill (S.C.) 638 (1837); Brownson v. Hull, 16 Vt. 309 (1844);
Spies, "Some Considerations in Conveying to Husband and Wife," 34 VA. L. REv. 480 at
485 (1948); Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §7604 (historical note). Few changes
have been made in these laws.
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ship has been involved. Furthermore, in the overwhelming majority
of decisions concerned with joint titles, language1 71 will be found indicating that survivorship is one of the compelling reasons why property
is taken in the names of husband and wife. Why, then, should a rule
of legal construction be opposed to this rule of practice? The fault it
seems may be attributed to the legal profession. Problems of joint ownership ordinarily arise during the course of administering an estate of
one of the deceased parties,1 72 and reaction to adverse rulings on technical matters of property do not incite the type of popular revolt that sometimes occurs in areas where the public are better informed and more
uniformly affected by adverse decisions. Consequently, lewyers have
the primary obligation of rectifying this conllict and settling upon a
policy which will cultivate the use of joint ownership as a method of
achieving marital security. The common law did this through the conceptual development of the estate known as tenancy by the entireties.
In some technical respects this kind of ownership did not measure up
to the standard of equality set by the married women's property laws,
a defect remedied by judicial legislation in most of the states where it
has been preserved.173 Other incidents of the estate may furnish a
target for nominal1 74 objections, but on the whole it was keyed to the
marital relations, thereby making it an inviting way in which to hold
property today. A uniform or model law preserving entireties in such
a form that it would not defeat the theme of equality which has been
written into marital ownership should be placed upon the agenda for
the Commissioners on Uniform Laws.
171 Outside of the entireties states litigation largely is concerned with transfers where
an intent to create joint tenancy or survivorship rights appears from the language used.
This problem of language will be explored in the material to follow. All but eight of the
states with joint tenancy statutes allow the estate or survivorship rights to be created where
expressly provided. See Appendix II, col. 3.
172 Cases involving inter vivos disputes between joint tenants and tenants by the
entireties are relatively few. E.g., Goe v. Goe, 134 N.J. Eq. 61 at 63, 33 A. (2d) 870
(1943) ("This is the first occasion upon which this court has had presented to it a dispute
between the original parties to a joint account").
173 See cases cited at notes 65-68.
174 A few writers criticize tenancy by the entireties for the reason that individual creditors cannot reach the property thus providing an opportunity for excessive exemptions. E.g.,
29 MrcH. L. REv. 788 at 789 (1931); 8 Mo. L. REv. 213 at 216 (1943); Wilkerson, "Creditors' Rights Against Tenants by the Entirety," 11 TENN. L. REv. 139 at 148 (1933); 17
N.C.L. REv. 157 at 160 (1939). Any respectable banker or businessman within an entireties jurisdiction takes the precaution of extending sizable credit over the joint names of
husband and wife. Entireties property can be applied to the payment of joint obligations.
E.g., Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 S. 843 (1936); First Nat. Bank of Goodland v.
Pothuisje, 217 Ind. 1, 25 N.E. (2d) 436, 130 A.L.R. 1238 (1940); Foland v. Hoffman,
186 Md. 423, 47 A. (2d) 62 (1946); Edwards & Chamberlin Hardware Co. v. Pethick,
250 Mich. 315, 230 N.W. 186 (1930); 53 HAn.v. L. REv. 1389 (1940). Unless there are
grounds for estoppel, or unless the property contributes to the risk, it is difficult to find a
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The prejudicial treatment accorded joint ownership of personal
property deserves brief comment. Presently seventeen states construe
transfers to husband and wife as creating tenancy by the entireties, and
one state, Wisconsin, prefers joint tenancy. Of this group, six jurisdictions-Indiana, Michigan, Oregon, New York, New Jersey and North
Carolina--draw the line at interests in real estate and disfavor joint
survivorship rights in personal property. Lawyers would be well advised
that the decisions responsible for this awful distinction deserve careful
re-examination for several reasons. In the :first place, most of them are
predicated up.on the supposition that entireties ownership of personal
property did not exist at common law, a supposition which cannot be
verified by the authorities. The British experience at the time when
personal property began to occupy a significant place in society was
exactly to the contrary. Furthermore, the common law impossibility of
this type of ownership was reasoned from the exclusive control retained
by the husband over the wife's chattels and choses in action, a proposition which became moot with the married women's property laws. If
there was some doubt that the married woman lacked capacity to hold
personalty by the entireties with her husband, this doubt should have
been dispelled by the laws giving her equal rights with men. As a matter of fact, these laws have been interpreted as giving the wife a share
in the control of entireties property in practically all of the states recognizing the estate today.175 Another factor of some significance is the
treatment accorded the language of the joint tenancy legislation, which
in many states was and is confined to interests in real estate. Almost
unanimously the policy of these laws was extended to personal propreason why a creditor should reach marital property. Hence a tort creditor whose cause of
action arises out of the use of entireties property can make a reasonable argument that it
should not be exempt. Hiller v. Olmstead, (6th Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 5. Cf. 27 MINN.
L. REv. 536 (1943). On divorce the relation terminates. E.g., Townsend v. Townsend,
5 Harr. (Del.) 493, 168 A. 67 (1933); Tendrich v. Tendrich, (D.C. Cir. 1951) 193 F.
(2d) 368 (court retained jurisdiction to partition entireties property upon granting limited
divorce). See note 289.
The fact that neither party can transfer his or her interest in entireties property or
otherwise terminate the relation without the consent of the other furnishes no real objection.
Since the property may be transferred or the relation terminated by mutual assent the law
does not sponsor a serious restraint upon alienation. E.g., Sheldon v. Waters, (5th Cir.
1948) 168 F. (2d) 483; Dodson v. Nat. Title Ins. Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31 S. (2d) 402
(1947). Failure of the parties to agree almost always is precipitated by causes leading to
divorce. However, some judici~ remedy should be provided for the resolution of genuine
disputes as to how the property should be used. Cf. Baker v. Cailor, 206 Ind. 440, 186
N.E. 769 (1933) (entireties property could be reached ·by abandoned wife for support);
Tendrich v. Tendrich, supra; 42 HARv. L. REv. 580 (1929). For cases where equity has
provided a remedy see note 68.
175 See

notes 65-68.
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erty,1 76 apparently for the obvious reason that no effort was made to
:find policy reasons for differentiating the two kinds of property with
respect to dual ownership. In any event the result of these decisions is
in the record, and as such is some evidence that there is no substantial
cause for treating joint ownership of personal property in a manner
wholly different from realty. But pragmatically speaking there are more
forceful reasons for favoring entireties ownership of personalty. Subsequent legislative activity in the field of joint ownership has been primarily concerned with joint rights in this kind of property, and on the
whole has tended to recognize and facilitate the creation of joint survivorship rights.177 Unlike transfers of real estate, which usually are
handled with the assistance of legal advice, acquisitions of personal
property occur in transactions where a lawyer is lacking.178 Hence there
is much greater need for a rule of property construction because of the
technical unfamiliarity of laymen with the language necessary to create
the various joint estates. Legal and extra-legal1 79 investigation would
show that joint acquisitions of personalty in the names of husband and
wife are made with the expectation that the property will pass to the
survivor.

[To be concluded.]
176 See note 79.
177 This legislation

(relating to bank deposits, stock, savings bonds and the like) on
the whole was passed for the protection of third ·persons and for the purpose of facilitating
gifts of joint survivorship rights from one of the parties to both. Only one statute was found
obviously intended to impede the establishment of joint ownership in personal property.
Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §683.1 (invalidating joint tenancy contracts of safe deposit
box contents). Cf. Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §23.1123.
178 E.g., Estate of Kwatkowski, 94 Colo. 222, 29 P. (2d) 639 (1934) ("preparation
of wills and other legal documents by laymen having a mere smattering of law will continue
to breed litigation"); Hammond v. Dugan, 166 Md. 402, 170 A. 757 (1934) (joint rights
established by a series of complicated directions to depository bank); Sawyer v. National
Shawmut Bank, 306 Mass. 313, 28 N.E. (2d) 455 (1940) (banker and broker advised as
to formalities for opening joint bank account); Peterson v. Lake City Bank & Trust Co.,
181 Minn. 128, 231 N.W. 794 (1930) (stock salesman advised as to form for holding
securities). A classic example of an effort by a father to do his own estate planning through
the dual ownership of a bank account and savings bonds is Reynolds v. Reynolds, 325 Mass.
257, 90 N.E. (2d) 338. (1950). In that case the father wrote his son, "there is little
sense in paying lawyers, etc. etc. and a few more et ceteras." Upon the father's death, the
property became embroiled in litigation which ultimately defeated his probable intent both
as to distribution and lawyer's fees. The records occasionally show that a person is steered
to the joint ownership of personalty by his lawyer. Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246, 34
A. (2d) 428 (1943) (lawyer advised H to register transfer of stock to Hand W with corporation-advice disregarded); McKenna v. McKenna, 260 Mass. 481, 157 N.E. 517
(1927). For a case involving the transfer of stock to the joint names of H and W upon
the advice of an attorney but with the doubts of the corporate officers, and where the
attorney apparently erred upon the effect of the transfer, see Manning v. United States
National Bank of Portland, 174 Ore. 118, 148 P. (2d) 255 (1944). Cf. Roach v. Plank,
300 Mich. 43, I N.W. (2d) 446 (1942) (donor consulted with lawyer in creating joint
tenancy in realty and personalty).
179 See Appendix I, F.
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APPENDIX I
EXTRA-LEGAL INDICATIONS OF THE WIDESPREAD USES OF, AND
ATTITUDES TOWARD, JOINT TITLES
A. Corporate Stock
A recent study of stock ownership in publicly owned corporations gives a fair picture
of the relative importance of joint shareholdings. KIMMEL, SHARE OWN.BnsmP IN THE
UNITED STAT.BS 67-68 (1952). On the basis of value (millions of dollars) distribution
was as follows:
Men ............................................ . 38,128.9
Women .......................................... . 33,368.1
Joint accounts ..................................... .
6,803.7
Other .................................•........... 53,787.1
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132,087.8
On the basis of numbers of shares (in thousands), distribution of ownership was as follows:
Men ............................................. 1,264,361.7
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,759.9
Joint accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267,454.3
Other ............................................ 1,216,703.1
Total .................................... 3,695,279.0
Informal interviews with ten Indianapolis stock brokers indicated that joint ownership
between unmarried persons is relatively small. This is substantiated by figures ( which may
or may not be typical) furnished by an Indianapolis transfer agent upon the stock ownership of a publicly owned corporation, as follows:
Number of single owners ......................... . 538 (78%)
Number of joint owners-husband and wife ......... . 126 (18%)
Number of joint owners-other .................... .
31 C 4%)
Total number of owners...................

695

B. Real Estate
Joint ownership of real estate is very common. A random sampling of 1071 recent real
estate transfers in Marion County, Indiana (Indianapolis) showed that in terms of numbers
joint ownership between husband and wife overwhelmingly is preferred. The break-down
was as follows:
Deeds to husband and wife............................... 681
Deeds to joint owners whose relationship did not appear. . . . . .
52
Deeds to single grantees or trustees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Deeds to business, charitable and governmental institutions...... 113
Total ......................................... 1,071
Note that over 76% of the transfers to individuals were in joint ownership. Joint
ownership between husband and wife therefore is probably much higher. A house-to-house
random study of 100 Indianapolis married couples indicated that 96% of those who owned
their own homes held them jointly.

C. Bank Accounts
Personal interviews with 42 employees who regularly take deposits for 42 different or
branch banking institutions (including building and savings and loan associations) in Indianapolis convincingly established that the joint bank account is extremely popular in this area.
Estimates of the number of accounts held jointly in their institutions were as follows:
Percentage of accounts
Number of bank employees
held jointly
estimating
70 or over
22
50 or over
14
under 50
5
no idea
1
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As between husband and wife the estimates on the whole were higher, as follows:
Percentage of accounts
owned by married people
held jointly with spouses
70 or over
50 or over
under 50
"mostly"
other

Number of bank employees
estimating
21
5
2
12
2

Because it was difficult to estimate the percentage of accounts owned or held by married
people jointly with their spouses, the twelve employees who stated that "most" of such
accounts were held jointly did so with the expressed idea that joint ownership is most
common between husband and wife.
A house-to-house random study of 100 Indianapolis married couples indicated that
joint ownership of bank accounts is high. In response to the question, "Do you own your
bank account jointly?" the answers were as follows:
Answer
Number answering
Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Yes, as to savings account, no as to checking account. . . . . . . . . .
3
No ................, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
No account ...........•........................•....... _ 7

D. United States Savings Bonds
On June 30, 1952 individuals held 63.5 billion in federal securities. AmmAL REPORT
oF S.BCllI!TARY OF TREASURY 79 (1952). It is reasonable to suppose that a substantial
portion of this tremendous investment is held jointly. In a house-to-house random study of
100 Indianapolis married couples the question was asked, "Do you own savings bonds
jointly?" Answers were as follows:
Answer
Number answering
Yes . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77
No................................................
14
No bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9

E. Automobiles
A random study of 1952 title cards in the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles indicates
that dual ownership of automobiles, while relatively small, may run into substantial figures.
Out of 1000 title registrations of passenger automobiles owned by individuals the following
infomiation fairly appeared:
·
Percent registered in dual names (34 out of 1000). . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4%
Fords (19 out of 500). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8%
Chevrolets (15 out of 500)........................... 3.1%
Percent registered in male and female names
(Probably husband and wife)
(12 out of 1000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2%
Form of registration (out of 34)
"A and B"........... .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..
17
"A or B".........................................
5
"A and/or B". ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9

"A, B," etc•....... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . .

3

In contrast to this was the information revealed by interviews with 100 Indianapolis married
couples. Of this group 30 out of the 88 who owned automobiles asserted that the family
automobile was owned jointly. This suggests a possibility that the rights of the parties lie
in parol evidence inasmuch as joint ownership appears with much less frequency upon
motor vehicle titles.
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F. Attitudes Towartl Survivorship
In the personal interviews with the 42 employees who regularly take deposits in
Indianapolis financial institutions (above) all were asked, "Do people with joint accounts
expect the account to pass to the survivor?" The answers were as follows:
Number of employees
giving the answer
Answer
39
"Yes" .. -........................................ .
1
"Most" .......................•......•.•.........
1
"More or less" .................................. ..
1
"Yes, in case of older people" ........................ .
These employees were asked the further question, "Why do people open accounts in joint
fonn?" Answers to this question were more varied, as follows:
Number of employees
giving the answer
Answer
16
Convenience ..................................... .
Survivorship ................•.•.................••
9
Convenience and survivorship ......•..................
5
Recommended by bank ............................. .
4
2
To avoid probate ...............................•...
Convenience, and to beat taxes ....................... .
1
Convenience, and to avoid probate ................... .
I
To evade inheritance taxes .....•.....................
I
Young men entering service ...•.....................•
1
''If you're married you're supposed to be one" ........... .
I
As between married people it is a "partnership proposition"
1
In the interviews with 100 Indianapolis married couples (above) these people were
asked what property was held jointly, and then, "Do you believe that it would pass to the
survivor?" The replies were as follows:
Number of persons
Answer
giving such answer
Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
84
No .............................................
3
Don't know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
Yes, if parties have been true. . . .. .. . . • . .. . . .. . .. .. .. .
I
No answer (because no property owned jointly). . . . . . . . . .
8
These residents were asked the further question, ''Why is your property held jointly?"
Answers were quite varied, and fell in the following categories:
Number of persons
giving such answer
Answer
Survivorship ..................................... .
26
No reason ....................................... .
20
Marriage is a partnership in which each shares ......... .
16
A good idea ...................................... .
11
Custom ......................................... .
8
Convenience ..................................... .
4
Advised ......................................... .
2
To avoid administration ............................ .
2
Taxes .........................•................•
1
Comes natural ................................... .
1
Put ~t ~at way when husband went into service ......... .
1
No Jomt property ................................. .
8
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GENERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS

N

0

~1) Estate or Incident
isfavored In favor of
tenancy in common

(2) Kind of
property

(3) Language
necessary

Ala. Code Ann.
(Supp, 1953) tit,
47, § 19

no survivorship
"when one joint tenant dies"

no specific deslgnation

"with right of survlvorshlp" or "other
words • • • showing
such Intention"

no

Ariz, Code Ann,
(1939) §§ 39-110,
71.122

"not In Joint tenancy" (§ 71-122);
property held" jointshall not survive
§ 39-110)

"by express words"
provide for survivor•
ship

excepted Cl 71•
122)

"in trust or to executors"

t"

"real property"
(§ 71-122); "propperty" granted or
devised (§ 39-110)

Ark, Stat, Ann,
(1947) §§ 50-411,

realt:r,: "Joint tenancy ' ( § 50-411)

"every interest In
real estate"

" unless expressly declared • • • to be a
joint tenancy"

no

no

61-114

·i>~rn;iia1i.;.; · ··•iiu~i: · ·,;i>~~ii~ii~i' estai.iF • '•i~~~i~'o·r;hiJ;s,i .....
vorships" abolished
(§ 61-114)

abolished

(4) Husband
and wife
mentioned

(5) Special
exemptions

(6) Method of
transfer
contemplated

(7) Transfers from
owner to himself and
another sanctioned

•• instrument''

applicable to "lnstru•
ments of conveyance"
where Intent to create
survivorship

"grants and devises"

..................
··················
····················
no
no

"Conveyance of realty
between spouses construed to pass interest
specified in the deed"
(§ 50-413)

applies to all property interests

"expressly declared
• , , to be a joint ten•
ancy"

included (Hand W
may hold property
as Joint tenants, In
common, or as
community, § 161)

partnerships and
community (§ 686)

"single will or transfer"; with respect to
personal property,
may be created by a
written transfer, Instrument or agreement

applicable to "transfer"
expressly declared to be
in joint tenancy"

"lands, tenements
or hereditaments"

"not In tenancy In
common but in Joint

no

no

"grant,

devise
conveyance''

or

applicable to "lands,
tenements and heredita•
ments" when declared
to be a l olnt tenancy

"no estate, In Joint

"lands, tenements
or hereditaments"

"asjolnttenants and
not as tenants in
common"

no

no

11

gralltt devise
conveyance''

or

D. C. Code (1951)
I 45-816

"joint tenancy"

real and personal
property
(See § 45-823)

"expressly declared
to be a joint ten-

included

"executors or trustees"

"granted or devised"

Fla. Stat. (1951) §

doctrine of "survlvorshlp" as applied
to "Joint tenants"

"real estate and
personal property"

"expressa; provide
for the ght of survivorshlp"

entireties excepted

no

"Instrument"

Cal. Clv, Code
(Deering, 1949)
§ 683

joint tenancy

Colo. Stat. Ann.
(Cum. Supp.
1953) c. 40, § 4

"no estate in joint

Conn,

No statutory provision

Del. Code Ann.
~1953) tit, 25,
701

689,15

tenancy"

tenancy"

tenancy''

ancy"

f~
r

r
,--,

entireties may pe ereated by deed of one
spouse "where purpose
to create such estate Is
stated" ( §689.11)

~
r-'
V1

N

Ga, Code Ann,
(1935) § 85-1002

joint tenancy

Real and personal
prorriy (Cf, § BS104

shall not exist and
shall be tenants In
common

no

no

no provision

Idaho Code Ann.
(1948) H 55-104,
55-508

tenancy In common
preferred unless declared a "joint Interest"

"every Interest"
and "every Interest In real estate"

"declared to be a
Joint Interest" or
"otherwise" (Cf. ~
55-104 with § 55-508

no; community
property excepted
from preference
for tenancy In
common

partnership and
community; realty
granted and devised to executors
or trustees

"declared In Its ereatlon"; realty
"granted or devised"

Ill, Rev. Stat, (1953)
c. 76, §§ 1, la, lb,
2, 2,1

personalty: "Incldent of survivorship
between joint ten-

"personal prop-

"Intention to create no
a Joint tenancy • , ,
with the right of survlvorshlp"
•··~iii-essiy. 'ciectai-eci. no
••• not In tenancy In
common but In joint
tenancy"

executors and
trustees

"wl11 or other lnstru•
ment In writing"

ants''

•iea'ti.y; • •:-~t'a'te· •
joint tenancy"

Ind, Stat. Ann.
(Burns Rep!.
1951) §§ 51-104,

erty''

in· · :-ia'iicis,
•ieiiemci;ts ·
or heredltaments"

personalty: survlvorshlp

and "contracts to
purchase real
estate"

\0
V1

..i::,.._.

transfer "not In tenancy
In common, but In Joint
tenancy with right of
survivorship" ( § 2.1)

.................. ·~ecutors'a'iici' •••• ·•~grant devise' or con:· ......................
grant or conveyance

"personal prop- "unless otherwise
erty"
expressed"

56-111

•.:e~i.r.; • ·• 1ioiiii ·
ancy •

-

trustees

entireties rlgh ts
In land contracts
and of tlons favored ~§ 56-901, 56903

veyance"

"not In tenancy In common but with • , • survlvorshlP,'' or "In Joint
tenancy ' (§ lb)

"Instrument"

... ia'iicis: a;: oi'a'ii;, · ·:•in' ioini ·ien'a"tic;, · ·e~cepted ·iro~ · •iiiaii'p1"ic~·bie' ·io · ···•i~·s·trument;;. or ······················
ien: · •Interest
and to the survivor statute (§ 56-112) "mortgages, nor to "conveyance or detherein"
of them" or "man!festly appear from
the tenor of the
Instrument" that
joint tenancy was
'Intended"

Iowa Code (1950)
§ 557.15

"tenancy In common
unless a contrary Intent Is expressed"

11

Kan. Gen, Stat.
Ann. (1949)
§ 58-501

"joint tenancy"

Ky, Rev. Stat.
(1953) §§381,120,
381,130

"joint tenants"

Louisiana

No statutory
provision

conveyances"

conveyances ln
trust" and executors (§ 56-112)

vise"

I

f
~

i
0

~

"unless a cont~
intent Is expressed '

no

no

"conveyances"

"real or personal
property"

"clear that a joint
tenancy was lntended"

Included

"executors or
trustees"

"grant or devise"

;g

"real or personal"

"manifestly appears
from the tenor of the
instrument" that
survivorship was
Intended

no entireties In
realty unless "a
right of survivorship Is expresslr,
provided for•
(§ 381.050)'

"executors or
trustees"

"Instrument"

~

'"cl

~

~

GENERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS, Continued

_,....,,.·
(1) Estate or incident

(2) Kind of

property

disfavored in favor of
tenancy in common

Me,

Rev.

Stat.

(3) Language

(4) Husband

necessary

and wife
mentioned

00

(5) Special

(6) Method of

transfer
contemplated

owner to himself and
another sanctioned
applicable to "conveyance of real property
, , • as Joint tenants or
with right of survivorship" (Me, Laws, 1953,
c. 301)

exemptions

"estates vested in
survivors upon the
principle of Joint

"land"

"unless otherwise expressed"

no

conveyances "In
mortgages"
excepted; realty or
personalty
conveyed "In mortgage or In trust
, , • with power to
appoint a successor" (c. 154, § 19)

"conveyances and
devises"

Ann. Code
art. so,

"Joint tenancy"

no specific designation

"unless ••• expressly
provided that the
property ••• Is to be
held In joint ten-

no

no provision

"deed devise or other
Instrument of writIng"

Mass, Ann. Laws

"Joint tenancy"

"land"

"Jointly, as joint tenants, or in joint tenancy, or to them or
the survivor of them
, , , or manifestly appears from the tenor
of the Instrument
that j olnt tenancy
was Intended"

Included

"except a mortgage or a devise or
a conveyance In

"Instrument"

"expressly declared
to be in joint ten-

excepted*

Inapplicable
to
"mortgages, nor to
devises or grants
In trust or made
to executors"

"grants and devises"

"expressly declared
to be In Joint ten-

no

inapplicable
to
"mortgages nor to
devises or grants
made In trust, or

"grants and devises"

"manifestly appears
from the tenor of the
Instrument" intent
to create "Joint tenancy or entirety with
the right of survivorship"

included (as well
as estates by entlrety)

"mortgages or devises, or conveyances made In

"instrument''

"expressly declared
, •• to be In joint
tenancy"

excepted

(1944)

C,

154, § 13

tenancy''

Md.

(1951)
§ 13

(7) Transfers from

ancy"

(1933) C, 184, § 7

Mich. Stat, Ann.

(1937) §§ 26,44,
26.45

Minn. Stat. Ann,
p947)
2)

§ 500,19

"joint tenancy"

11

lands''

trust''

ancy"

"Joint tenancy"

"lands"

ancy"

applicable to real estate
"transferred by a person
to himself jointly with
another" (c. 184, § 8)

~

f~
r

r

to executors"

Miss. Code Ann.
(1942) § 834

Mo. Rev. Stat.
(1949) § 442,450

"~olnt tenancy or ent ety"

"joint tenancy"

"land"

"every Interest In
real estate"

trust"

"executors and
trustees"

,....,
"grant or devise"

conveyance of real estate
creating Joint tenanc&;
entireties, tenancy
common or partnersh18
{§ 442.025, Supp, 1953

~
r-'
V1
I.'-.)

Mont, Rev. Code
Ann, (Rep!. 1953)
H 67-313, 67-308,
67-310

"joint tenancy" or
"estates by entirety"

Nebraska

no express provisions

Nev, Comp, Laws
{Su pp • 1 9 41)
§ 3710

"joint tenancy"

N, H. Rev. Laws
(1942) C, 259,
11. er. N. H.
aws, 1953, c,
178, § 11

i

N. J, Rev. Stat.
(1937) § 46:3-17

"Joint tenancy"

"Joint tenancy"

"every Interest"

"expressly declared
to be a joint tenancy"; where "survi..
vorshlp" contained
in grant of realty

Included, ( § 67313); survivorship
in estates by entirety where "contained" in grant of
realty (§ 67-310)

partnerships

-

"single wlll or transfer"

\0

V1

.j::,,.

applicable to conveyances creating "Joint
tenancy, tenancy In
common, or tenancy In
partnership" {Neb, Rev.
Stat. § 76-118, 1943)
real and personal
property

"real estate"

no specific deslgnation

"expressly declared
in the transfer to be
a joint tenancy"

"expressed . . . as

Joint tenants, or to
them and the survivor of them, or
other words , •• clearly expressing an intentlon to create a
Joint tenancy"

included (Hand W
may hold real and
personal property
as Joint tenants,
tenants in common, or in community) § 3362
(1929)

single will or transfer;
with respect to personal property "may
be created by a
written transfer,
agreement or instru-

is applicable to transfer
of real property

I

r

mcnt"

"conveyance or devise''

~

1-t:l
no; but Joint tenancy in mortgages
preferred as between H and W
(§ 46:2D-1, Cum.
Supp, 1952)

"clearly expressed
• • • that it shall be
held by both parties"
{§ 75-111)( "as joint
tenants" § 75-134)

no (H and W may
hold property as
Joint tenants, tenants in common or
as community
§ 65-401)

ancy in common"

ants"

no

create an estate In
Joint tenancy and
not an estate of ten-

"intention • . . to

"when granted to
executors or trustees as Joint ten-

'--'

N. M. Stat, Ann,
(1941) § 75-111;
id, § 75-134
{Supp. 1951)

tenancy in common
favored (§ 75-111)j
"Joint tenants'
(§ 75-134)

interests in real
estate and mortgages In real estate

N, Y. Real Property
Law (1945) § 66

"Joint tenancy"

no specific
designation

"expressly declared
to be in Joint
tenancy"

no

N. C, Gen. Stat.
Ann, (1950) § 41-2

"joint tenancy"

real or personal

[survivorship
abolished]

no

"grant or devise"

"executors or trustees"

applicable to conveyances of real estate in
Joint tenancy (§ 46:317.1, Cum. Supp, 1950)

"grant or bequest"

~

0

~
~
I'd

trt

"executors or

trustees"

"granted and
devised"

applicable to conveyances of realty creating
estates in severalty, a
Joint tenancy, or a
tenancy by entirety
(§ 240-b)

partners; trustees
(§§ 41-2, 45-8);
executors
(§ 28-184)

*Entireties rights are specially favored with respect to contracts to sell entireties realty (§ 26,191) and In ~ertaln types of intangible personalty (§ 26,211),

~

00

~

00

GENERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS, Concluded
(1) Estate or Incident

disfavored In favor of
tenancy In common

N, D. Rev. Code
(1943) § 47-0206

"joint tenancy"

Ohio

No express
provisions

Okla. Stat. (1951)
tit. 60, § 74

(2) Kind of
property

(3) Language
necessary

(4) Husband
and wife
mentioned

(5) Special
exemptions

(6) Method of
transfer
contemplated

(7) Transfers from
owner to himself and
another sanctioned

joint "Interest"

"expressly declared
• , • to be a joint
tenancy"

no

"executors or trustees as joint
tenants"

"single will or
transfer"

applicable to Interests In
realty conveyed In
olnt tenancy"
( 47-1023)

joint tenancy and
tenancy by entirety

"real or personal
property"

"expressly declared
• , • to be a joint
tenancy or • , • tenancy by entirety"

yes (may be described as joint
tenants or by entlrety)

"executors or
trustees"

"single Instrument,
will or transfer"

applicable to joint tenancy and entireties

Ore. Comp, Laws
(1940) §§ 70-108,
8-303

"joint tenants"

''lands or Interest
therein"

"expressly declared
• , • as joint tenants''
pater statute "abolshed" joint tenancy
In lands (§ 70-205))

"tenancy by entlrety , , • shall be
such as Is now
fixed ( § 8-303)

"executors and
trustees"
10-201, 10-208>

"conveyance or
devise'

applicable to tenancy by
entireties In realty
where Instrument shows
Intent to create such
estate (§ 63-210)

Pa. Stat, Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit, 20,
§ 121

"joint tenants"

no specific
designation

[shall not accrue to
the survivors)

no

"trust estates"

R. I. Gen, Laws
(1938) C, 431, § 1

"joint tenancy"

"real or personal
estate"

"that the tenancy Is
to be joint, or that
the same Is to • , • the
survivor ••• of them
••• or manifestly appears that [they)
take as joint tenants
and not as tenants In
common''

yes

"trustees or
executors''

"gifts, feoffments,
grants, conveyances, devises or
legacies"

applicable to deeds of
lands, heredltaments, or
a thing In action jointly
with another Including
conveyances between
husband and wife
(c, 435, § 17)

S, C. Code Ann.
(1952) § 19-55

"j o~t tenancy"

"any estate"

!survivorship
shed)

S. D. Code (1939;
Supp, 1952)
§§ 51.0212,
51.0214

"joint tenancy"

no specific deslgnation

"declared ••• to be a
joint tenancy"

no

"partnership";
and "executors or
trustees" as "joint
tenants"

"single will or transfer"

applicable to real and
~rsonal property where
tent to create joint
tenancy (§ 51.0212,
Supp. 1952)

Tenn. Code Ann.
~Williams, 1934)
§ 7604, 8461

"joint tenancy"

"real and
sonal''

per-

{survivorship
whed)

m

~

"I

applicable to conveyances of real estate by
the entireties. Tit. 21,
§ 551 (Supp, 1953)

f~
i

r

abol-

abol-

entireties expresslr
preserved (§ 8461

partners

applicable to entireties
where Intent to create
such estate appears In
Instrument (§ 7605,1,
Supp. 1952)

.---,

~
r'
V1
~

[survivorship
!shed)

j olnt tenancy

"every Interest In
real estate •.. "
§ 74-2-34 provides
that "legacies"
vest In owners In
"common''

"Joint tenancy" or
"with rights of survivorship" or "and
to the survivor of
them"

no

"Joint tenancy"

"lands • , , for
years, life, or in

"expressed ••• Jointly, or as Joint tenants, or in Joint tenancy to , , • the survivors" or manifestly
appears from the
tenor of the instrument that it was intended to create •••
Jolat tenancy"

excepted

"in trust"

"conveyances and
devises ••• "

"manifestly appears
from the tenor of the
instrument that"
survivorship was intended

Included

"executors or trus-

"instrument''

shed)
!survivorship

dealings with community as provided by statute

"Joint estate"

Utah Code Ann.
(1953; Supp.
1953) §57-1-5

Vt. Stat.
§ 2632

(1947)

.....

"real, personal or
mixed'

Tex. Rev. Clv. Stat.
(Vernon, 1951)
art. 2580

fee"

abol-

no

Va, Code Ann,
(1950) §§ 55-20,
55-21

husband and wife
take "by moieties";
other part of statute
applies to "Joint tenant(s)"

"real or personal"

Wash, Rev. Code
(1952) § 11.04.070, as amended,
Wash. Laws 1953,
C, 270

"joint tenants" and
"tenants by the entireties"

no specific designation

W. Va. Code Ann.
(1949) §§ 3539,
3540

Joint tenants and
tenants by the entireties

"real or personal"

"manifestly appears
from the tenor of the
Instrument that"
survivorship was intended

entireties included

Wis. Stat. (1951)
§§ 230.44, 230.45

"Joint tenancy"

land

"unless expressly declared to be in Jolat

excepted

Wyoming

No express provision

tenancy''

abol-

"In the grant"

tees"

applicable to real prop.
erty where intent to
create Joint tenancy

........

I
may convey to grantor
and another-applicable
to deeds of land ( § 55-9)

I
!z

l

where survivorship
has been revived
by statute; "trustees"

0

"executors or trus-

"instrument"

inapplicable
to
"mortgages, nor to
devises or grants
made in trust, or
made to executor"

"grantsanddevlses"; applicable to transfers
"deed, transfer or of realty and personalty
assignment" between between husband and
husband and wife
wife and any "deed" to
other grantees, where
"intent ••• to create a
joint tenancy" expressed

tees"

\0
V1
..i:,..

~

i
l:Tl

~

00
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APPENDIX ill
LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
Statutes applicable to accounts in the form "payable to either, or payable to either or
the survivor": D.C. Code (1951) §§26-201, 26-202 (banks and building and loan associations); Fla. Stat. (1951) §653.16 (banking institutions, building and loan associations
and federal savings and loan associations); Ga. Code Ann. (1935) §13-2039 (banks); Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Burns Repl., 1950) §§18-2001, 18-2618 (banks, savings banks and trust companies); Iowa Code (1950) §528.64 (banks or trust companies); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(1949) §§9-1205, 9-1503 (banks and safe deposit boxes); La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §6:751
(building and loan associations); Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 55, §36 (savings banks, trust
companies, loan and building associations); Md. Ann. Code (1951) art. 11, §102 (banks,
savings institutions, or trust companies); Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1952) §5205 (banking
institutions, including national banks and postal savings banks); Mont. Rev. Code Ann.
(1947) §5-528 (banks); N.J. Rev. Stat. Cum. Supp. (1950) §l7:9A-218 (banks, savings
banks and national banking associations); N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §50-1003 (commercial,
savings banks and trust companies); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1950) §53-146 (banks, trust
companies, banking and trust companies); N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §6-0366 (banking associations, annuity, safe deposit, surety and trust companies); Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 6, §118-o
(banks and trust companies); S.C. Code (1950) §§8-171, 8-602 (bank, banking institution,
depository, building and loan associations or federal savings and loan associations); S.D.
Code (Supp. 1952) §6.0414 (banks); W.Va. Code (1949) §3164(1)(c) (building and
loan, federal savings and loan associations); Wis. Stat. (1951) §221.45 (banks, trust companies, banks, and mutual savings banks); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §35-148 (state
and national banks).
Statutes applicable to accounts in a form payable to "either, or the survivor": Ariz.
Code Ann. (Supp. 1951) §§51-516, 51-540 (commercial banks, savings banks and trust
companies, and safe deposit boxes); Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §67-521 (banks); Cal. Civ.
Code (Deering, 1949) §1828; Conn. Gen. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§5831, 5906 (savings banks,
savings deposits of state banks, time deposits of any national banking association, and shares
in building and loan associations); Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 5, §923 (banks, trust
companies, savings banks or other banking institutions); Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 55, §36
(savings banks, trust companies, loan and building associations); Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943)
§23.303 (any banking institution); Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§362.470, 363.740, 369.150
(banks, trust companies, savings and loan associations); Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §8-167
(any bank); Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1931-1941) §743 (banks, trust companies or other
depositories); N.Y. Banking Law (1950) §§134(3), 171(3), 239(3), 310(6), 394(1),
453-a (1950) (bank and trust companies, private banks, savings banks, savings and loan
associations and credit unions); Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §1105.09 (banks and
trust companies); Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §716.750 (mutual savings banks); R.I. Gen.
Laws (1938) c. 135, §3, c. 158, §10 (banks, savings banks, trust companies and building
and loan associations); Tenn. Code Ann. (Supp. 1952) §5935.1 (banks and trust
companies); Utah Code Ann. (1953) §7-3-45 (banks); Vt. Stat. (1947) §8780 (banks,
trust companies, savings banks, savings institutions and savings banks and trust companies); Wash. Rev. Code (1951) §32.12.030 (account payable to "either or the
survivor of them"-mutual savings banks); id., §30.20.015 (national banks, state banks,
trust companies, or any banking institution under the supervisor of banks); W.Va. Code
(1949) §3205(23) (any banking institution, including national banking associations);
Wis. Stat. (1951) §§215.14, 215.15, 222.12(9) (savings and loan associations and savings
banks).
•
Statutes applicable to accounts in a form payable to "either, or either or the survivor
of them": Iowa Code Ann. (Supp. 1953) §534.21 (building, and federal savings and loan
associations); Mass. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1953) c. 167, §14, c. 168, §34A, c. 172A, §SA (any
bank, savings banks, banking companies); Minn. Stat. (1949) §55.10 (safe deposit boxes).
Statutes applicable to accounts in a form "payable to either, or payable to the survivor":
Ala. Code (Supp. 1953) tit. 5, §§128(2), 128(2a) (certi£cates of deposit, savings accounts
and checking accounts); Idaho Code Ann. (1948) §26.1014 (any bank); N.H. Rev.
Laws (1942) c. 314, §8 (building and loan associations); Va. Code (1950) §§6-55, 6-187.
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6-264 (banks, trust companies, building and loan associations and safe deposit boxes); Vt.
Stat. (1947) §8779 (banks, trust companies, savings banks, savings institutions and savings
banks and trust companies.
Statutes applicable to accounts in a form payable to "either": La. Rev. Stat. (1950)
§6:32 (banks, savings banks and trust companies); Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§708.515,
722.315 (banks, trust companies and building and loan associations); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
(Vernon, 1953) art. 342-710 (banks); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 15, §1074-609;
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1953) tit. 7, §819-903; tit. 15, §1081.2 (banks, banks and
trust companies, savings banks, trust companies, employees' mutual banking associations,
private banks, federal savings and loan associations and building and loan associations);
Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §36-108 (building and loan associations).
Statutes applicable to accounts in a form payable "to them, or either of them": Colo.
Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 18, §45 (banks and trust companies). Cf. Minn Stat. (1949)
§§48.30, 52.13 ("upon joint and several account"-applicable to banks, savings banks and
credit unions); S.D. Code (1939) §7.0207 (building and loan association stock issued to
two or more persons "or their survivors, in either joint or several form"); Wis. Stat. (1951)
§215.15 (savings and loan association shares in names of two or more persons "or either,
or their survivor").
Statutes applicable to accounts in a form payable "to the survivor": Cal. Fin. Code
(Deering, 1951) §852 (banks, savings banks, commercial banks and trust companies);
Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 25, §70 (building and loan associations); Nev. Comp. Laws
(Supp. 1931-1941) §974.12 (building and loan associations); N.H. Laws (1953) c. 162
(accounts in comprehensive list of banking and financial institutions "payable to either,
and to the survivor"); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1953) art. 88la-23 (building and
loan and federal savings and loan associations); Utah Code Ann. (1953) §7-7-12 (building
and loan associations).
Statutes applicable to writing expressing an intent to create "joint tenancy with the
right of survivorship":
Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 76, §2 (generally applicable to personal
property, but the same statute approves accounts in bank and trust companies in the names
of two or more "payable to them" and building, and federal savings and loan association
shares issued in the "joint names of two or more ••• or their survivors). Cf. id., c. 32,
§496.8 (credit union shares may be issued "in joint tenancy, or in survivorship"). But cf.
id., c. 32, §230 (building and loan shares and certificates may be issued to two or more
persons "and the survivor").
Statutes applicable to accounts in a form payable to one of the parties "on death":
Iowa Code Ann. (Supp. 1953) §534.21 (building, and federal savings and loan associations-subject to payment of decedent's debts); N.J. Rev. Stat. Cum. Supp. (1950)
§17:9A-217; id. (1938-1948) §17:13-20 (banks, savings banks and national banking
associations and credit unions); Utah Code Ann. (1953) §7-7-12 (allowing owners of
building and loan association shares to name a "beneficiary").
Statutes applicable to accounts in a form payable as "joint tenants": Cal. Fin. Code
(1951) §§7604, 11204 (building, and federal savings and loan association shares issued "as
joint tenants or in a form to be paid to any of them or the survivor"); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums
Repl., 1950) §18-2137, and id. (Supp. 1953) §18-2137 (building and loan association
shares and industrial loan certificates issued "as joint tenants, or in a form to be paid to
them, or to the survivor"); id., §18-2219 (credit union shares "may be issued in joint
tenancy"); Mass. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1953) c. 170, §15 (shares of cooperative banks may
be held "as joint tenants or in the name of two or more persons or the survivor"); Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1943) §23.584 (share account in federal savings and loan association issued
"as joint tenants, or in a form to be paid to them, or to the survivor"); Mont. Rev. Code
Ann. (Repl. 1953) §67-309 (safe deposit box "when so specified in the agreement •••
shall be a joint tenancy''); R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 158, §10 (two or more persons may
hold shares of building and loan association "as joint tenants"); Wash. Rev. Code (1951)
§33.20.030 (building and loan association shares held "as joint tenants with right of survivorship").
Statutes applicable to accounts in a form payable in the "joint names of two or more
persons or their survivor": Ala. Code (1940) tit. 5, §255 (building and loan associations);
Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §67-820 (building and loan associations); ill. Rev. Stat. (1953)
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c. 32, §255f (state and federal savings and loan associations); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949)
§17-5804 (savings and loan associations); N.D. Code (1943) §7-0407 (building and loan
associations); Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §1151.9 (building and loan association
deposit in the "joint account of two or more persons ••• payable on the order of any one •••
and ••• payable notwithstanding the death or incapacity of one''); Okla. Stat. (1951) tit.
18, §212b (building and loan associations and federal savings and loan associations).
Statutes applicable to accounts in a form payable to "two or more persons": Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1943) §23.547 (building and loan associations); Mont. Rev. Code Ann (1947)
§7-144 (building and loan associations); Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §8-317 (building and
loan association certificates "made to the joint account of two or more persons"); N.J. Rev.
Stat. Cum. Supp. (1952) §l7:12A-49 (building and loan associations); N.C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. (1950) §54-18.1 (building and loan associations); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon,
1953) art. 88la-23 (building and loan associations and federal savings and loan associations).
Statutes applicable to persons who become depositors "jointly": Wash. Rev. Code
(1951) §31.12.140 (credit unions).

